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framework, the Article identifies and explores the meaning of 
underlying statutory policies, such as consistency and fairness. 
Although the Article's focus is on private rulemaking, its conclusions 
are shown to be relevant to public rulemaking and possibly even to 
judicial decisionmaking. 
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Perfection is unlikely in human contrivances . ... We 
hold to the values of the past provisionally only, in 
the knowledge that they will change, but we hold to 
them as guides. 1 
Nought may endure but Mutability. 2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Uniform state laws increasingly represent some of the most 
important statutes in America.3 Yet because these laws originate 
from private lawmaking groups, such as the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and The 
American Law Institute (ALI),4 their enactment does not follow a 
traditional legislative process. Professors Schwartz and Scott 
recently found significant differences between private and public 
lawmaking and, as a result, concluded that "the complacency that 
has heretofore marked the academic attitude toward the private 
lawmaking groups [that is, ALI and NCCUSL, referred to in their 
article as "private legislatures"] is not warranted. . .. [A]cademic 
attention should focus on . .. how private lawmaking groups 
function."5 This Article attempts to heed that challenge, and 
indeed goes beyond it, by examining fundamental questions that a 
rulemaking process should address. 
1 ALExANDER M. BICKEL, THE MoRALITY OF CONSENT 22·24 (1975). 
2 PERCY B. SHELLEY, MUTABILITY I, st. 4 (1816). 
3 At the end of 1994, there were more than 160 uniform state laws, including the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act, Uniform Arbitration Act, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 
Uniform Commercial Code, Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Uniform Criminal 
Extradition Act, Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, 
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act, Uniform Parentage Act, Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Dl Act, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Uniform Simultaneous 
Death Act, Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. UNIFORM 
LAWS ANNOTATED DIRECTORY OF UNIFORM ACTS AND CODES (master ed. 1994) [hereinafter 
U.LA DIRECTORY]. 
• See generally infra note 11 (discussing composition, organization, and duties ofNCCUSL 
and ALD. 
6 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. 
PA. L. REv. 595, 651 (1995). 
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This Article examines private rulemaking in the context of the 
most influential and widely followed uniform. state law, the 
Uniform. Commercial Code (UCC or "the Code").6 Using the UCC 
revision process as a model, the Article suggests that deficiencies 
result from the ad hoc nature of private rulemaking. The author 
proposes a framework for helping to correct these deficiencies: the 
rulemaking process would become more focused, and less ad hoc, if 
rulemakers would step back and ask fundamental questions about 
the consequences of the proposed rules. The discipline of asking 
these questions is referred to as imposing "constraints" on the 
rulemaking process; the constraints themselves derive from the 
fundamental policies and principles underlying the body oflaw that 
is the subject of the rulemaking. 
By examining academic literature and the Code itself, the author 
identifies clarity, flexibility, fairness, simplicity of implementation, 
consistency, and completeness as the fundamental categories of 
constraints. Although these categories may appear somewhat 
intuitive and general, the Article demonstrates the importance of 
precisely defining the constraints in the context of the law being 
examined7 and then applies the constraints to current NCCUSL 
and ALI rulemaking proposals. The constraints are shown to 
6 The UCC has been enacted as the basis of commercial law in every state of the Union. 
See U.L.A. DIRECTORY, supra note 3, at 9-74 (noting state by state enactment ofUCC). 
7 The precise meaning of the constraints is discussed in Part m, at least from the 
perspective of commercial law. As an overview, clarity reflects the goal of preserving 
expectations so that parties to commercial transactions will know in advance what is 
expected of them and the consequences of their actions. Supra subpart m.A. Fleribility 
preserves freedom of contract by allowing consenting parties to reach contractual 
arrangements different than those contemplated by law. Supra subpart 1ll.B. FleribilUy 
also allows the continuing development in the marketplace of new forms of commercial 
transactions. Id. Fairness helps to preserve expectations by ensuring that parties are 
governed by neutral rules. Supra subpart m.c. In more limited circumstances,{airness also 
can mean that the law should protect weaker parties, such ns those with less bargaining 
power; that opportunistic behavior should be prevented in circumstances that could not have 
been contemplated in advance; and that implicit rules of conduct should be recognized if they 
arise from widespread courses of dealing in an industry or from pnrticulnr courses of dealing 
between specific parties. Id. Simplicity ofimplementatum. reduces transactional costs and 
expenses. Supra subpart m.D. Consistency helps to preserve expectations and also 
minimizes transactional costs by eliminating multiple or conflicting legal requirements. 
Supra subpart m.E. Finally, completeness helps to minimize transactional costs by 
systematizing rights and obligations under developing areas of the law without waiting for 
the slower and more ad hoc process of the common law. Supra subpart Ill.F. 
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stimulate new, multidimensional ways of thinking about the 
problem addressed by the rulemaking and are useful in testing the 
consequences of the proposed rules. Constraints also are shown to 
help approximate the benefits of widespread participation in 
private rulemaking, a process that has been accused of being elite 
and not wholly participatory.s Finally, the Article shows that, 
because constraints make conscious what ought to be implicit in 
any good rulemaking, they could apply to a public as well as a 
private rulemaking process and possibly even to judicial decision-
making. 
Constraints can guide rulemaking, but cannot be used as a 
formula to make rules. It would be misleading to believe, and this 
Article does not suggest, that constraints could be used by a 
rulemaker to reach a specific result.9 Just as a compass can orient 
a hiker in the right direction, but cannot distinguish between 
footpaths that appear to go in the same direction, so too the 
constraints can guide the direction of statutory rulemaking, but 
cannot dictate the ultimate result. The value of constraints lies in 
critically examining proposed rules and in revealing possible 
consequences and alternative approaches; constraints should be 
viewed in that context. Before asking how to examine statutory 
rulemaking, however, one must first understand the private 
rulemaking process. 
8 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes 
on the Process of Revising ace Articles 3 and 4, 26 LoY. LA. L. REv. 743 (1993) (claiming 
uee revision process lacks consumer representation). 
9 This Article does not advocate a natural law conclusion. The author is not insisting that 
there is a natural order to the law nor that, through the use of constraints, this order can 
be more easily discerned. On the contrary, this Article adopts a pragmatic view; it advocates 
that the use of constraints will enable private rulemakers to develop and attain consensual 
goals more effectively. 
1995] STATUTORY RULEMAKING INQUIRY 915 
II. THE PRIvATE RULEMAKING PROCESS AND A FRAMEWORK 
FOR ADDRESSING ITS LIMITATIONS 
A. THE UCC RULEMAKING AND REVISION PROCESS10 
Statutory rulemaking under the UCC is initiated by ALI and 
NCCUSL through a jointly sponsored Permanent Editorial Board 
for the Uniform Commercial Code (PEB).l1 It is a somewhat 
discretionary process, initially dependent upon a perception by the 
PEB that some revision or addition to the UCC may be desir-
able.12 The multiyear revision process currently being undertaken 
with respect to Article 9 of the UCC13 provides both an opportuni-
10 The factual description of the Article 9 rulemaking process is based on the Agreement 
Describing the Relationship of the American Law Institute, the NalioMl Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and Permanent Edi1crial Board with ResJXd to the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 64 A.L.I. PROC. 769 (1987) [hereinafter PEB GtJverning 
Agreement], see generally infra note 11 (describing agreement), and PERMANENT EDrroRIAL 
BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STuDy GROUP UNIFORM CO!J?JERClAL 
CODE AImCLE 9 REPoRT (1992) [hereinafter PEB REPoRT], see generally infra nota 14 
(describing report), as well as conversations with and comments from Professor Frederick 
H. Miller, Executive Director ofNCCUSL, William ?It Burke, chairman of the Article 9 study 
committee, and Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Director of ALL Article 9 bns bean revised 
twice since its original promulgation in 1952, resulting in the 1962 and 1972 Official Texts. 
Article 9 is now in the process of being revised for the third time. See infra nota 14 
(discussing revision process). 
11 ALI is a private group of American legal scholars, including practitioners, academics, 
and judges. It is responsible not only for the UCC but also for the various "Restatements-
of law. NCCUSL, which consists of about 300 practitioners, academics, and judges, drafts 
uniform laws in various disciplines which it then proposes to stata legislatures for 
enactment. The members in most instances are appointed by the governor or legislature of 
their state, and each state gets one vote for ballots on proposed uniform laws. In addition 
to administering drafting committees for uniform laws and assisting in revising the UCC, 
NCCUSL also meets annually to debate the work of the drafting committees and to adopt 
uniform laws. Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1804 (1994). 
ALI and NCCUSL created the PEB pursuant to an agreement on August 5, 1961. That 
agreement was superseded by an agreement dated July 31, 1986, which presenUy governs 
the PEB's operations and existence. PEB GtJverning Agreement, supra note 10. 
12 The PEB Governing Agreement provides that -rilt shnll be the function of the PEB to 
• •• monitor the law of commercial transactions for needed modernization or other 
improvement." PEB GtJverning Agreement, supra note 10, at 774. 
III Article 9 of the Code governs secured transactions, such as loans secured by collateroJ, 
and also covers certain sales of intangibles that are associated with commercial financing. 
Other articles of the Code govern sales of goods (Article 2), leasing of personal property 
(Article 2A), negotiable instruments (Article 3), bank deposits and collections (Article 4), 
electronic funds transfers (Article 4A), letters of credit (Article 5), bulk transfers and sales 
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ty and a reason to examine private rulemaking in action.l4 
In the current process, two respected lawyers or academics are 
designated as reporters for a study committee composed of Article 
9 experts.lS They solicit comments and rulemaking suggestions 
from others in the field, examine and refine these comments, and 
contribute their own ideas. Subjects of particular difficulty may be 
examined by specialized task forces of the study committee. The 
study committee ultimately prepares a report setting forth its 
recommendations. This report is considered and debated before a 
larger and more diverse group of commercial lawyers and academ-
ics, including representatives of the American Bar Association.ls 
The report, after being modified as considered appropriate and 
approved by the PEB, is then submitted for action to the sponsoring 
organizations. 
The Article 9 report was accepted and a drafting committee was 
appointed by ALI and NCCUSL in accordance with the PEB 
Governing Agreement.17 The purpose of the drafting committee 
is to consider the study committee's recommendations and to 
propose statutory language. The drafting committee, by its nature, 
is subjected to a lobbying process in the course of preparing the 
proposals. The final product, once approved by the sponsoring 
organizations, will be recommended to state legislatures for 
enactment. The enactment effort, as for any other uniform state 
law, is undertaken by NCCUSL alone. 
(Article 6), documents of title such as warehouse receipts and bills oflading (Article 7), and 
investment and uncertificated securities (Article 8). 
14 Article 9 is presently undergoing revision. A PEB study committee, after obtaining the 
views of various commercial lawyers and academics, submitted their proposals to the PEB, 
which, on December I, 1992, issued a formal report. PEB REPORT, supra note 10. That 
report is now being considered by the drafting committee. 
15 The process is not, however, fully institutionalized. For example, there was no study 
committee for the 1972 amendments to Article 9 and no reporters for the PEB study 
committee that revised Article 2 of the Code. In some cases, such as revision of Article 5 of 
the Code, the study may be performed by the American Bar Association. 
18 In May of 1993, for example, ALI and the American Bar Association jointly sponsored 
a two day forum in New York City to review the study committee report. 
17 Although it is not widely known, meetings of the drafting committee are open, and 
interested persons can attend. 
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B. FLAWS IN THE EXISTING RULEMAKING PROCESS 
The UCC rulemaking process reflects an understanding that 
commercial transactions and practices change over time, and 
therefore, any statutory commercial code must be updated periodi-
cally.1S When the UCC was first adopted, ALI and NCCUSL 
agreed that the process should be renewed when experience showed 
that a statutory provision was unworkable or obviously in need of 
revision, when courts misinterpreted the UCC, or when new 
commercial practices rendered provisions obsolete or mandated 
structural change.19 No conceptual framework, however, has been 
put into place for amending the UCC. As a result, the rulemaking 
process has a tendency to expand and lose focus during consider-
ation of proposals. The proposals may not even be related to the 
specific problems that caused the revision process to be undertaken; 
they may also fail to connect to any of the recommendations of the 
study committee. 
Such an ad hoc approach20 is costly. Dozens, sometimes hun-
dreds, oflawyers and academics periodically meet, usually for days 
at a time, to debate the myriad of rulemaking proposals that are 
18 See, for example Grant Gilmore, On the Dif/icultiu of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 
YALE L.J. 1341, 1359 (1948) where Gilmore notes: 
The theory of the proposed [Uniform] Commercial Code is that we must 
keep our statutes up to date. If the project is successfully carried 
through, we should understand that we have probably committed 
ourselves to basic revisions at fairly short time intervals. However 
excellent the new Code may be it will no doubt be necessary, in another 
twenty-five years or so, to revise the revisions. 
lJJW.A.Schnader, The Permanent EditcrUzl Board for the Uniform ComnzercUJl Code: Con 
it Accomplish its Object? 3 ML Bus. L.J. 137, 139 (1965). See also PEB Gouermng 
Agreement, supra note 11, at 774 (describing PEB's function of revising UCC when 
necessary). 
20 For an evaluation of the approach, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., In1rodudion to the 
Uniform Commercial CodeAnnual Survey: Some Observations on the Past, Present, & Future 
of the UCC, 41 Bus. LAw. 1343, 1355 (1986). Mooney examines the drafting projects then 
underway in the mid-1980's and suggests ways to improve the revision process in the future. 
He argues that the only way to describe the drafting process is "that it was ad hoc. Other 
than [some ABA] Section involvement ... the process followed no perceptible pattern. 
Perhaps the most that can be said is that from time to time certain small groups of 
individuals decided, in the first instance, to cause the law to change or be codified.- Id. 
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advanced. This effort goes on for years:21 It takes anywhere from 
three to five years for a statutory change to have been studied, 
drafted, and first proposed for legislative enactment. This requires 
an enormous devotion of human and professional capital.22 Other 
costs result from the inevitable transition and re-education of the 
commercial law community. Furthermore, indirect costs may result 
from inadvertent ambiguities and problems of the revised statutory 
language: New rules can raise new problems ofinterpretation.23 
Another flaw in the rulemaking process is that it creates an 
unintended momentum for change. Although at no point within 
the process is change technically a foregone conclusion, the 
investment of time represented by the creation of a study commit-
tee, its solicitation of comments and suggestions, and its prepara-
tion of a report,24 create an incentive to revise the UCC, even 
21 A member of ALI who reviewed this Article and wishes to remain anonymous 
suggested that the process takes as long as it does because it is administered by a group of 
"busy amateurs" and that the process would be streamlined if run by full·time staff. 
Although beyond the scope of this Article, the author's reaction is that such a change would 
reduce the process's valuable diversity, possibly diminish its quality, and shin costs from the 
"pro bono" hours now devoted by practitioners and academics to the more direct costs of staff 
salaries. Furthermore, the slowness of the process may have a silver lining ifit encourages 
careful deliberation and broad participation of interested parties. In this context, at least 
one reviewer of this Article, Harry C. Sigman, a noted commercial law scholar, practitioner, 
and member of the Article 9 drafting committee, told the author that he felt too few people 
participate at the critical early stages of the revision process and that there is insufficient 
deliberation. 
22 Cf. Mooney, supra note 20, at 1347 ("[T)he study, promulgation, and enactment of 
uniform state laws and amendments is an excruciatingly slow and cumbersome process."). 
23 For example, the 1972 Article 9 revisions adopted the "last event test" for perfection 
of collateral consisting of goods in a multistate transaction. UCC § 9·103(1}(b}. Shortly after 
the 1972 text of the Code was promulgated, a heated dispute broke out between Homer 
Kripke and Peter Coogan, two ofthe Code's revisers, as to the meaning of this test. Compare 
Homer Kripke, The 'Last Event' Test for Perfection of Security Interests Under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 47, 48-49 (1975) (asserting that last event text 
harmoniously coexists with statutory priority rules), with Peter F. Coogan, The New uee 
Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REV. 477, 539-42 (1973) (criticizing last event test for creating 
uncertainty). See also Charles M. Levenberg, Comments on Certain Proposed Amendments 
to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 MINN. L. REV. 117, 154·55 (1971) ("[T]he 
revised version [of § 9·103(1)] must be deemed a failure. . .. [It is] overly complex and 
certain to cause confusion."}. Indeed, the revisers of the UCC are now proposing to eliminate 
the last event test. See PEB REPORT, supra note 10, at 78-79 (recommending ways to revise 
last event test). 
:u The December I, 1992 study group report for Article 9 revision, for example, occupies 
249 printed pages in addition to its 624 page appendix. PEB REPORT, supra note 10. 
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where, objectively, change may be unnecessary. Once extensive 
time is devoted to an endeavor, few will say that revision is not 
needed: people will feel compelled to show "results," and there will 
be an expectation on the part of third parties that results will be 
shown.25 
Scott also demonstrates that the UCC rulemaking process is 
susceptible to pressure from cohesive interest groups, such as 
financial institutions.2G He argues that when capture occurs, a 
private legislature "will create 'bright-line' rules, and ... the 
substance of those rules will favor the capturing industry.J>27 The 
2S Mooney notes that, traditionally, the response of the UCO's sponsors to "perceived 
problems" such as nonuniformity was "to change the text repeatedly." Mooney, supra note 
20, at 1347. However, if changes occur too onen, the Code itself may become confusing to 
parties engaging in commercial transactions: ,,[One orthe) eight distinct routers) to disaster" 
in maintaining a "system ofIegal rules" is "introducing such frequent changes in the rules 
that a [party affected) cannot orient his action by them.· LoN L. Fuu.ER, THE MoRAUIY OF 
LAw 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969). 
26 Scott, supra note 11, at 1816·21. Accord Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, 
Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 78 MINN. L. REv. 83 (1993) (exploring impact of interest groups on uniform laws 
process). 
Professor John H. Langbein, an NCCUSL Commissioner, observed to the author that 
certain non-controversiaI areas of law, such as gratuitous transfera, are much less subject 
to interest group pressures and conflict. This comports with NCCUSL's own internal 
criteria: "As a general rule, [NCCUSL) should avoid consideration of acts on subjects that 
are: (1) entirely novel and with regard to which neither legislative nor administrative 
experience is available [and) (2) controversial because of disparities in social, economic or 
political policies or philosophies among the various states· NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COmns5IONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1993·94 REFERENCE BOOK 109 (1994); see also 
John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous Transfers: 
The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REv. 871, 877 (1992) (noting that BOme uniform 
laws, such as the Uniform Probate Code, seldom attract attention of powerful interest groups 
because these laws are not "unduly controversial"). Schwartz and Scott echo this view: 
The founders [of ALI and NCCUSL] intended their proposed organiz.n-
tions only to deal with issues that satisfied two "jurisdictionalD require-
ments: first, that society had reached a consensus concerning the 
relevant values; and, second, that those values could be translated into 
laws solely with the use of traditional legal expertise. The organiz.ntions 
would perform poorly, the founders believed, were they instead to 
attempt the typically legislative tasks of harmonizing value conJlict and 
regulating complex economic activity. 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5, at 652. 
Z1 Scott, supra note 11, at 1827; see also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5, nt 644 
(explaining concept of capture in this context). For example, the revision process for Articles 
3 and 4 of the uce has been criticized for its alleged capture by financial institutions and 
failure to encourage the involvement of consumer groups. See Rubin, supra note 8 
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reason industry desires bright-line rules is that precise rules reduce 
its compliance costs. If the interests of the capturing 
group-frequently financial institutions-tend to coincide with the 
interest of society at large, the resulting rule will likely be benefi-
cial. Unfortunately, those interests do not always coincide.28 
The rulemaking process also involves many changes over many 
years by many different people. The UCC, as a result, has 
numerous provisions that are at best redundant and at worst 
conflict with others.29 
The rise and fall of the so-called "New Payments Code" (NPC)so 
illustrates these and other problems. Its intention was to integrate 
all areas of commercial law dealing with payments into one unified 
treatment within the UCC. SI Hal Scott, a distinguished Harvard 
Law School professor, acted as its reporter and produced a draft 
described as "a major intellectual achievement."S2 However, after 
years of work by Professor Scott and numerous others, opposition 
by both consumer groups and banks became so strong that the NPC 
was dropped.s3 What went wrong? 
The New Payments. Code failed for several reasons, but the 
primary failure was its overriding focus on uniformity.S4 The 
NPC, while thoughtful in many ways, was so complicated that 
people could not easily understand how it worked or how to 
(discussing lack of consumer representation in drafting of UCC Articles 3 and 4). 
28 Frank Grad suggested to the author that the public legislative process is subject to 
much of the same interest group pressure as private rulemaking. Interview with Frank P. 
Grad, Chamberlain Professor of Legislation at Columbia Law School, in New York, N.Y. 
(Mar. 20, 1995). For a discussion of the possible application of constraints to public 
legislating, see infra subpart V.B. 
29 See, e.g., David Mellinkoff, Tire Language of tire Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE 
L.J. 185, 185, 225 (1967) (noting that "language [of 1962 Official Text of Code] is now clear, 
now mud; now grammatical, now illiterate; now consistent, now inconsistent, slapdash and 
slovenly" and that "lack of internal consistency and clarity in the statute itself is the best 
possible assurance that in the long run construction will not be uniform."). 
30 UNIFORM NEW PAYMENTS CODE (P.E.B. Draft No.3, 1983). 
31 The NPC would have revised Articles 3 and 4, added a new article dealing with 
electronic funds transfers, and harmonized the laws of credit card payments and payments 
made by checks. Id. 
32 Rubin, supra note 8, at 745. 
33 Id. at 745-46. 
34 Interview with Paul M. Shupack, professor of commercial law at Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law, Yeshiva University, in Chicago, IL (May 18, 1995); interview with Donald J. 
Rapson, member of PEB, in Chicago, IL (May 18, 1995). 
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implement its rules.35 It was so specific that some wondered 
whether it could successfully accommodate future methods of 
payment.3S It was opposed by banks because unification of 
payment law would reduce their favorable treatment under UCC 
Articles 3 and 4 governing the checking system,37 and it was 
perceived as unfair to consumers, due to fears that the harmoniza-
tion oflaws would dilute their rights under credit card transactions 
with their lesser rights relating to bank checks.38 After much cost 
and years of wasted effort, the NPC was dropped because its main 
attribute-consistency among methods ofpayment-became illusory 
due to the remote likelihood of uniform state legislative enactment 
in the face of widespread bank and consumer opposition. 
C. A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING THE RULE MAKING PROCESS 
Private rulemaking, therefore, can be unfocused, costly, and 
susceptible to interest group politics. Yet at least in the uniform 
state law arena, private rulemaking has important redeeming 
attributes.39 It brings together, in ways that an individual state 
legislature could not, experts from around the country to pool their 
knowledge and ideas in the development of nationally uniform 
statutes. It also provides-through organizations such as ALI and 
NCCUSL-a forum. in which dedicated and talented lawyers, 
judges, and academics can provide a public service. This Article, 
therefore, takes as axiomatic that private rulemaking has a role in 
the creation of uniform state laws and focuses on how the private 
rulemaking process can be improved. 
The author believes that one solution is to introduce a framework 
of constraints on the rulemaking process. Constraints are a set of 
precepts that reflect the fundamental policies and principles 
underlying a body of law; they can be used by rule-makers to 
question and assess the consequences of particular rulemaking 
S5 Id. 
S5 Id. 
31 Id. Accord Rubin, supra note 8, at 746 (noting banking indWlUy opposition due to 
NPC's less favorable treatment). 
38 Id. 
S9 Cf. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5, at 650 (analyzing strengths and weaknesses of 
private rulemaking groups such as ALI and NCCUSL). 
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proposals. The framework provided by constraints, however, would 
not yield specific rules. The value of constraints lies instead in 
making the process more efficient by ensuring that ruIemakers 
maintain their focus on these fundamental principles.40 Further-
more, Part IV of this Article shows that the application of con-
straints can reveal hidden connections and stimulate new ways of 
thinking about the issues being addressed by the rules. However, 
before showing how constraints can improve the ruIemaking 
process, it is first necessary to identify them. 
D. IDENTIFICATION OF CATEGORIES OF CONSTRAINTS 
Constraints should reflect the fundamental policies and principles 
that underlie the body of law to be governed by a statute. In 
revising a statute, therefore, the place to start in identifying 
potential constraints is the statute itself. Section 1-102 of the UCC 
sets forth the Code's "[u]nderlying purposes and policies" as follows: 
"(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commer-
cial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commer-
cial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; 
[and] (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions.,,41 Other policies generally underlying the UCC are com-
mercial reasonableness42 and preserving expectations.43 
40 Cf. Steven L. Harris, Using Fundamental Principles of Commercial Law to Decide UCC 
Cases, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 637, 648-49 (1993) ("Perhaps contemporary commercial law 
professors have directed the focus too far away from fundamental principles-either to nuts 
and bolts or to meta-theory-to the disadvantage both of their students and of those who in 
turn rely on them."). 
41 U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1990). 
42 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-203 (imposing duty of good faith), 2-510(3) (providing that, when 
buyer repudiates or breeches sales contract, seller may "treat the risk of loss as resting on 
the buyer for a commercially reasonable time"), 2-608(2) (requiring revocation of acceptance 
to be within reasonable time after buyer learns of grounds for revocation), 2-609 (allowing 
party to demand adequate assurance that is commercially reasonable when there are 
commercially reasonable justifications for party to be insecure). 
43 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-205 (providing that parties' course of dealing and usage of trade 
are important to interpretation ofUCC contracts), 2-208 (stating that course of performance 
of sales contract is "relevant to determining the meaning ofthe agreement"), 2-315 (imposing 
implied warranty that goods are fit for particular purpose), 2-508 (allowing seller to cure 
defects in tender or delivery if time for performance has not expired), 2-609(1) (imposing 
"obligation on each party that the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not 
be impaired"). 
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What categories of constraints can be derived from these policies? 
The goals of "simplifying" and "clarifying" the law suggest simplici-
ty and clarity as possible constraints. Rulemakers should strive for 
a statute that is clear and simple to apply. "Moderniz[ation]," 
however, is not a constraint on rulemaking but merely a reason to 
revise a statute. Permitting "continued expansion" (and, by 
implication, modernization) of the law through "custom, usage and 
agreement of the parties" suggests that a statute should be flexible 
enough to allow such practices. This indicates flexibility as another 
possible constraint. 
Making the law "uniform . . . among the various jurisdictions" 
suggests that uniformity might be a constraint. However, a more 
fundamental way of describing uniformity would be "consisten-
cy,»« which includes various layers of meaning that are described 
later in this Article.45 
Commercial reasonableness and preserving expectations are 
related. They both mean that reasonable expectations should be 
preserved. Preservation of expectations, however, would be an 
unfortunate constraint on statutory rulemaking because, taken 
literally, it could be used as a justification to keep the law static. 
Perhaps a more rational way of ensuring that reasonable expecta-
tions are considered is to say that rules should be perceived as fair. 
Where a proposed rule would change expectations, rulemakers 
should judge the rule in part by whether the parties affected by it 
would view the change as fair. Fairness, therefore, is another 
possible constraint on rulemaking. 
Another methodology for identifying constraints is to examine the 
policies and principles that scholars, academics, and legal philoso-
phers have found to underlie the body oflaw governed by a statute. 
Gilmore, one of the chief legal theorists of the Code, focused on 
flexibility.46 Llewellyn, the principal draftsman of the Code, 
44 Uniformity of the law is merely a subset of consistency. For example, 11 low level of 
consistency would be for different states to have separate laws that are not inconsistent with 
each other, whereas a high level of consistency would be for those states to have the exact 
same (that is, absolutely uniform) laws. 
45 See infra Part IILE (describing different levels of consistency). 
45 "[I]t is a matter of vita! importance that the Code ns a whole be kept in terms ofsuch 
generality as to allow an easy and unstrained application of its provisions to new patterns 
of business behavior." Gilmore, supra note 18, at 1355. 
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focused on certainty as an important policy consideration and also 
noted clarity, simplicity, convenience, fairness, completeness, and 
accessibility.47 Langdell and Grey would add comprehensiveness, 
completeness, formality, conceptual order, and acceptability.48 
Hawkland also believed that pre-UCC commercial statutes failed 
because they were not preemptive and comprehensive.49 
Llewellyn's principle of certainty would appear to be subsumed 
within the constraints of clarity and fairness. Certainty means 
that a law is clear, hence the constraint of clarity. Certainty also 
means that the law's application is predictable, thereby preserving 
expectations, but the proposed constraint of fairness already has 
been shown to be a way of ensuring that expectations are pre-
served. 
Llewellyn's principles of fairness and simplicity already have 
been identified as possible constraints. Accessibility appears to be 
included in the constraints of clarity and simplicity. Convenience 
also appears to be subsumed in simplicity. This leaves Llewellyn's 
principle of completeness as an additional possible constraint. 
Hawkland's belief that commercial law should be preemptive and 
comprehensive would appear to confirm the choice of completeness 
as a constraint. Regarding the principles of Langdell and Grey, 
completeness already has been noted as a possible constraint and 
appears to include comprehensiveness. Formality and conceptual 
order appear to be included in the proposed constraints of clarity 
and consistency, while accessibility appears to be included in the 
proposed constraint of simplicity. 
It is reasonable, therefore, to hypothesize that there are six 
categories of constraints: clarity, simplicity, flexibility, fairness, 
47 Karl N. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 687· 
90 (1948). 
48 See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1983) (interpreting 
Christopher C. Langdell's constraints); see also, Roy Goode, The Codification of Commercial 
Law, 14 MONASH U. L. REv. 135 (1988) (arguing that UCC would be good model for 
codification of commercial law in Australia and identifying eight principles which underlie 
the philosophy of commercial law: party autonomy or freedom to contract and receive benefit 
of bargain, predictability, flexibility, good faith, encouragement of self-help, facilitation of 
secured transactions, protection of vested rights, and protection of innocent third parties). 
49 William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291. 
92. 
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consistency, and completeness.5O This hypothesis can be tested to 
some extent by considering Lon L. Fuller's allegory of how a legal 
code may miscarry.51 In the Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence at 
Yale Law School in 1963, Professor Fuller examined how a 
monarch who "came to the throne filled with the zeal of a reformer" 
would "set about drafting a new [legal] code.,,52 His analysis of 
how "a system of legal rules may miscarry"53 gives credence not 
only to this Article's proposed categories of constraints, but also to 
the possibility that those categories and the constraints themselves 
may have validity beyond Article 9 and commerciallaw.~ 
Fuller believed that the "first and most obvious [way in which a 
system oflegal rules may miscarry] lies in a failure to achieve rules 
at all, so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis."ss 
This lends support to the constraint of "completeness": A statute 
should cover the subject matter purported to be governed by it so 
60 Constraints do not directly address the question of when revision is necessary. 
Nonetheless, one might consider revision whenever a provision of Article 9 violates one or 
more of these constraints and cannot be justified in light of the remaining constraints. For 
a discussion of when statutory revision is necessary, see Fairfax Leary, Jr. & David Frisch, 
Is Revision Due {or Article 2? 31 VILL. L. REv. 399 (1986). While that article deals 
specifically with Article 2 of the uee, its insights may pertain to Article 9 as well. In 
answering the question, "What are the sources to which one should look in order to diEtover 
whether there is a strong enough need to justify revision?," Leary and Frisch suggest that 
one must look, in part, to the practical difficulties that the provision has engendered. rd. at 
405. For example, they suggest that one consider, among other things, whether there has 
been litigation arising from particular Code sections, splits ofjudicin1authority, cases where 
judicial interpretations are inconsistent with reasonable trade prectices, and criticisms by 
practitioners. Id. at 404-05. 
51 FULLER, supra note 25, at 33-34. 
&2 Id. 
53 Id. at 38-39. 
M Fuller posited that a system ofIega! rules may miscarry in at least eight ways: failing 
to achieve rules at all, failing to make rules understandable, enacting conflicting rules, 
enacting rules on conduct beyond affected parties' powers, failing to properly administer 
rules, failing to publicize rules, passing retroactive legislation, and changing rules too 
frequently. Id. at 39. The first five are relevant to this Article. See infra Part m 
(discussing constraints of clarity, flexibility, fairness, simplicity of implementation, 
consistency, and completeness). Of the remaining three ways, two-failure to publicize rules 
and abuse of retroactive legislation-relate to the administration of justice and are not 
relevant here. The last way-"introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the 
subject cannot orient his action by them," FULLER, supra note 25, at 39-already has been 
addressed in the context of the danger of constantly changing the Code, supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
5.5 FULLER, supra note 25, at 39. 
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that most issues can be decided by applying rules. Next, Fuller 
said that a legal code may miscarry through "a failure to make 
rules understandable."56 The constraints of clarity and, to a lesser 
extent, simplicity would counter this failure. Fuller also criticized 
"the enactment of contradictory rules. ,,57 The constraint of 
consistency would prevent this failure. Lastly, Fuller argued 
against "rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the 
affected party" and against incongruities between rules as an-
nounced and as actually administered.56 According to Fuller, 
these incongruities may arise "in a great variety of ways [including] 
mistaken interpretation [and] inaccessibility of the law.,,59 This 
suggests that the constraint of simplicity should take into account 
the ability of the parties to act in accordance with the proposed 
rule. Simplicity, therefore, may be better expressed as "simplicity 
of implementation." 
These categories of constraints strike a responsive chord in the 
author's own experience as a teacher and practitioner of commercial 
law, and they have been discussed with various leading academics 
and practitioners.6o Some have queried whether the constraints 
may represent no more than what ought to be implicitly considered 
in an ideal rulemaking process. To some extent, the answer is yes, 
but rulemaking involves people and, therefore, is imperfect. Precise 
definition and explicit application of constraints, as shown in Parts 
III and IV, will bring into conscious thought an essential judgment 
that otherwise may remain inarticulate and ignored.61 The 
66 [d. 
67 [d. 
66 [d. 
69 [d. at 81. 
60 This Article benefits from comments and criticisms received from the following 
distinguished academics and practitioners: Amelia H. Boss, Robert A. Burt, Barkley Clark, 
Neil B. Cohen, Robert C. Ellickson, Stanley H. Fuld, Frank P. Grad, Henry B. Hansmann, 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, John H. Langbein, Frederick H. Miller, Charles W. Mooney, Thomas E. 
Plank, Donald J. Rapson, Cruz Reynoso, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Albert J. Rosenthal, Edward 
L. Rubin, Stephen Scher, Alan Schwartz, Paul M. Shupack, Harry C. Sigman, Sandra S. 
Stern, Peter H. Weil, Peter Winship, William F. Young, Barry L. Zaretsky, and Julianna J. 
Zekan. 
61 Cf. RAMIN JAHANBEGLOO, CONVERSATIONS WITH ISAIAH BERLIN 110 (1992) (defining 
profound thought as one that "touch[es] a nerve and thereby reveal[s] ••• quite suddenly 
something which is part of our common experience and matters very greatly in our lives, but 
of which we were not clearly aware"). 
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constraints also can bring conceptual clarity and intellectual rigor 
to the rulemaking process and provide a basis for judging conse-
quences of proposed rules. The ultimate test, though, will be found 
in experience itself. Can constraints provide a conceptual frame-
work and perspective that rulemakers will find useful? Will 
constraints add discipline and efficiency to the rulemaking process? 
This Article is intended to begin a dialogue on the subject.62 
It should be re-emphasized that constraints do not constitute a 
rulemaking formula. Their value is in examining and critically 
questioning proposed rules and revealing possible consequences and 
alternative approaches.63 Constraints therefore supplement, but 
do not replace, an examination of the sociological, economic, 
psychological, and political factors that are also necessary for 
rulemaking.64 Using the compass analogy discussed earlier,65 
constraints can give guidance to rulemakers like a compass can 
give direction to a hiker. Constraints ultimately will be subject to 
sociological and other factors just like the direction given by a 
compass must be altered to avoid unpassable gorges or rivers.6S 
62 Some may contend that rationality is or should be a constraint. The author believes 
that rationality is generally subsumed within the foregoing constraints (particulnrly fairness 
and simplicity of implementation). Although it is possible to conceive an irrational rule that 
may stretch the application of the constraints-for example, that no statutory sentence 
exceed 25 words-ultimately people with serious intent will decide what changes are 
appropriate. Changes that are silly, or just plain not sensible, either will not seriously be 
proposed or will be winnowed out through the application of common sense. 
Others may contend that the synthesis or unification of commerclallaw and the clearing 
away of "dead wood" also should be constraints. These, however, are subsumed within the 
constraints of clarity, consistency, and simplicity of implementation. If Article 9 is 
straightforward, unambiguous, and clear, and can be applied to actual transactions in a cost-
effective and commercially acceptable way, the "dead wood" of commercial law has been 
cleared. 
It is not claimed that the constraints identified in this Article are immutable. The author 
has sought, however, to identify fundamental categories of constraints. Whether or not these 
categories are enduring, their content will undoubtedly change over time to reflect changes 
in the principles and policies underlying commercial law. 
63 See supra Part n.e (discussing value of constraints). 
lit Cf. RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOhnNG LAw 207 (1995) (maintaining that social science 
sometimes may contribute more than law tojudicial decisionmaking); see also infra subpart 
V.D (addressing law and psychology of constraints). 
63 Supra text following note 9 (comparing hiker's use of compass to constraints on 
rulemaking). 
flO Another way of thinking about this is to view the constraints as implicit in crafUng any 
well made rule. A well1TUlde rule is not necessarily a good rule unless it successfully 
grapples with the social, economic, and political factors that may be relevant. 
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III. DEFINING THE CONSTRAINTS 
The remaining job of this Article is to give content to the 
constraints, demonstrate how they can be applied to private 
rulemaking, and show why they can improve the rulemaking 
process. Before applying the constraints, this Article now turns to 
an analysis-really a precise definition-of what these constraints 
mean. 
A. CLARITY 
A statute, particularly one governing commercial law, should be 
clear. Clarity is important to minimize mistakes, ambiguities, and 
resulting disputes and litigation.67 Clarity also helps to preserve 
expectations, which is essential to market transactions.68 
A clear statute minimizes misinterpretations by judges and 
practitioners. Poorly decided commercial law cases often result 
from "textual inadequacies or ambiguities in the U.C.C. itself."69 
For example, the Tenth Circuit recently erroneously held, in 
Octagon Gas System, Inc. v. Rimmer, that a transfer of accounts, 
even if a true sale, will not remove the accounts from the trans-
ferors bankruptcy estate.70 The court erred because 
it confused the terminology of Article 9-denominat-
ing a true sale as a security interest in order to treat 
a sale of accounts the same as a loan secured by 
accounts for purposes of perfection and other UCC 
requirements-with a substantive determination that 
a sale of accounts is not effective to transfer owner-
67 See Mellinkoff, supra note 29, at 223-27 (discussing UCC's emphasis on uniformity over 
clarity). 
68 Cf. Vallejo v. Wheeler, 1 Cowp. 143, 153, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012,1017 (1774) (Mansfield, 
L.J.) (declaring that "in all mercantile transactions the great object should 00 certainty"). 
63 Mooney, supra note 20, at 1353; accord, E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Uniformity of 
Commercial Law and State· by-State Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions, 30 
HAsTINGS L.J. 337, 343 (1978). 
70 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993). See PEB COMMENTARY No. 
14, SECTION 9-102(lXB), 3B U.L.A. 89, 91 (Supp. 1995) (deeming Tenth Circuit's analysis 
erroneous and adopting contrary position) [hereinafter PEB COMMENTARY No. 14]. 
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ship of the accounts in the event of the seller's 
subsequent bankruptcy.71 
929 
Had the terminology of Article 9 been drafted more clearly, this 
confusion would not have resulted.72 
The Octagon Gas case illustrates, however, that speaking about 
drafting a clear statement is sometimes easier than actually 
drafting one. Article 9 artificially had defined the term "security 
interest" to include sales of accounts.73 This was a shorthand 
drafting technique that created a more elegant statute by avoiding 
constantly having to refer both to sales and secured transactions.74 
Article 9 could repeatedly have referred to sales and secured 
transactions where it meant to cover both, but the resulting 
verbiage itself might have been confusing and, therefore, unclear. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest how Article 9 should 
have been drafted to avoid the Octagon Gas problem.75 The 
71 Steven L. Schwarcz, 'Octagon Gas' Ruling Creates Tunnoil for Commercial and Asset· 
Based Finance, 210 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Aug. 4, 1993). For a charming discussion of how mialeading 
Code definitions can confuse a reader, see Mellinkoff, supra note 29, at 195-96. MellinkolT 
suggests the problem is that 
[ond words are given not merely new meanings, but meanings that 
contradict their everyday usage in and out of the law, as well as 
conflicting with their meanings in other portions of the Code. The 
language is difficult for anyone (even the draflsman) to follow. It is as 
though one suddenly redefmed ears to mean shoelaces, and went about 
telling friends, "I put on my shoes and tied my ears.· After a time, a 
good friend might understand, whatever his private opinion might be. 
Anyone else would dismiss it as gibberish. 
Id. at 196. 
72 See Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Worklwrses: The Sale of Accounts and Chattel 
Paper Under the U.C.C. and the Effects ofVwlating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 
CONN. L. REv. 397 (1994) (discussing how certain provisions of Article 9 violate normal usage 
in drafting); see also PEB COMMENTARY NO. 14, supra note 70 (illustrating confusion and 
offering clearer position). 
73 U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(1)(b) (1994). 
7C See PEB COMMENTARY No. 14, supra note 70, at 89 n.3 (noting that including both 
sales and secured transactions was Gsimply a drafting techniqueD). Issuance of PEB 
Commentaries is one method by which the PEB presently attempts to maintain clarity and 
resolve ambiguities in the UCC. PEB REsoLUTION ON PuRPosEs, STANDARDS AND 
PRocEDURES FOR PEB COMMENTARY TO THE UCC, 3B U.L.A. 600, 600 (1992). The 
constraints might be applicable especially to the formulation ofPEB Commentruy and UCC 
Official Comments because the Commentary and Comments are not subject to the controls 
of legislative ratification. 
76 For drafting suggestions in that regard, see Plank, supra note 72, at 497-520. 
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problem illustrates, however, that clarity does not always mean 
simplicity or economy of expression.76 
Neither does clarity necessarily mean that Article 9 should 
specify its application in detail or adopt rigid, although clear, 
pronouncements. More detail results in less flexibility. Also, 
because commercial law practices constantly change but Article 9 
changes only periodically, an overly detailed or rigid statute may 
become out-of-date and unusable sooner than a broader one.77 
Professors Schwartz and Scott have theorized that private 
rulemaking may be inherently biased against clarity: 
[A] vague rule that leaves the status quo relatively 
intact is preferred, cet. par., to doing nothing .... 
[Some] rules are less likely to create reputational 
losses for participants [in private rulemaking] and 
may actually create reputational gains. . . . Reputa-
tional gains derive from the fact that [these] rules 
are couched in phrases with positive affect (such as 
"good faith" or "reasonable") or appear to consider all 
relevant factors.. .. [V]ague rules can create direct 
economic gains for [private rulemakers; they] in-
crease or maintain uncertainty, and thus increase, or 
do not reduce, the occasions on which lawyers will 
have to give advice or be involved in litigation.78 
78 Fuller echoes this principle: 
During a visit to Poland in May of 1961 I had a conversation with a 
former Minister of Justice that is relevant here. She told how in the 
early days of the communist regime an earnest and sustained effort was 
made to draft; the laws so clearly that they would be intelligible to the 
worker and the peasant. It was soon discovered, however, ••• that 
making the laws readily understandable to the citizen carried a hidden 
cost in that it rendered their application by the courts more capricious 
and less predictable. 
FULLER, supra note 25, at 45. 
77 Cf. infra note 83 and accompanying text (addressing dangers of over.precision). 
78 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5, at 616 (footnotes omitted). An NCCUSL Commission-
er, who wished to remain anonymous, told the author that draft;ing committee members 
frequently are unable to agree on a substantive rule and then are presented with three 
alternatives: (i) no rule; (ii) the rule as stated; (iii) the rule as qualified by a phrase having 
positive affect, such as "reasonable" or "good faith." Usually, the qualified statement oftha 
rule wins. 
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Such an inherent bias of the rulemaking process would make the 
constraint of clarity all the more important as a counterbalance. 
One of the main advantages of having a clear statute is that 
parties can understand what is expected of them and of others. 
However, the ability to innovate around unwanted or outmoded 
expectations is part of the principle of flexibility. 
B. FLEXIBILITY 
Flexibility to innovate has long been regarded an underlying goal 
of commercial law.79 Commercial law must adapt to changing 
markets and circumstances. It must also be flexible enough to 
allow people involved in commercial transactions to innovate in 
response to such changes. One of the strengths of Article 9 is that 
it approaches secured transactions from a conceptual standpoint 
and does not (as did pre-UCC statutes) use the transactions 
themselves or their form as the organizing principle. The conceptu-
al approach, although less precise, allows greater flexibility by 
providing a framework for the creation of transaction forms 
unimagined when Article 9 was first drafted.so 
A flexible commercial law statute also can reduce the need to 
amend the statute constantly in order to take new practices into 
account. Fewer revisions can mean lower costs and greater 
consistency, provided the statute itself does not create additional 
costs by impeding advantageous commercial transactions or 
creating ambiguities. The UCC presently encourages flexibility, not 
only by permitting the continued expansion of commercial practices 
by custom and usage,S1 but also by allowing parties considerable 
freedom to contract around existing impediments within Article 9 
itself.s2 
79 u.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1994). 
80 U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 1 states: 
When it is found that a security interest as defined in Section 1-201(37) 
was intended, this Article [9] applies regardless of the form of the 
transaction or the name by which the parties may hove christened it. ••• 
[A]ny new [forms of secured transactions] which the ingenuity oflawycra 
may invent, are included. ••. 
81 U.C.C. § 1-102(2). 
82 See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (allowing parties to contract around all but a few requirements). 
Contractual variations can bind only the parties consenting to the contract. They cannot 
bind, for example, general unsecured creditors, judgment and tort creators, and trade 
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Flexibility also can be better served by keeping statutory 
language broad, thereby encouraging courts to interpret the law 
innovatively as customs and practices evolve: 
[I]t is a matter of vital importance that the Code as 
a whole be kept in terms of such generality as to 
allow an easy and unstrained application of its 
provisions to new patterns of business behavior. 
Commercial codification cannot successfully over 
particularize: the penalty for being too precise is the 
statute will have to keep coming in for repairs (and 
amendment is a costly, cumbersome, and unsatisfac-
tory process) or else become a dead letter.83 
There is, however, considerable tension between the constraints of 
clarity and flexibility. Consider, for example, the question of 
whether a given transfer of accounts receivable constitutes a sale 
under the UCC. In order to preserve "freedom of contract" 
"between business men" and to increase flexibility, Article 9 leaves 
that question to the courts to decide.84 This reduces clarity (and 
consistency), however, because the courts in each jurisdiction are 
able to define what would constitute a sale. Today, even more so 
than when Article 9 originally was drafted, clear and consistent 
rules determining what constitutes a sale would be desirable 
because of the increasing dominance of the capital markets by 
structured finance and asset securitization transactions.so On the 
other hand, rigid rules would undermine the flexibility to create 
creditors. See generally infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text (labelling these groups 
as "Affected Non-Parties" and addressing related fairness concerns). Nor can they vary the 
order of priorities among conflicting security interests in the same collateral, except as 
between the consenting parties. Compare U.C.C. § 9-312 (establishing rules for priority of 
conflicting security interests in same collateral) with § 9-316 (allowing priority rules to be 
subordinated by agreement). 
83 Gilmore, 8upra note 18, at 1355. 
84 See U.C.C. § 9-502(2) cmt. 4 ("The determination whether a particular assignment 
constitutes a sale or a transfer for security is left to the courts."). 
85 See STEvEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF AsSET 
SECURITIZATION (2d ed. 1993) (noting rise of structured finance and explaining legal 
principles of asset securitization). 
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new approaches that help to expand these markets.es 
The tension between clarity and flexibility also is illustrated by 
Article 9's definition of an "instrument" as "a negotiable instrument 
... or any other writing which evidences a right to the payment of 
money ... and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business 
transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assign-
ment."S7 The flexibility achieved by adding the underscored 
language undercuts the clarity of knowing exactly what constitutes 
an instrument when the ordinary course of business of transfers is 
ambiguous or unknown.es 
C. FAIRNESS 
The principle of fairness is integral to virtually all bodies of law, 
including commercial law.89 Its meaning, however, is often 
obscure. 
Fairness encompasses the oft-heard goal of commerciallaw-pre-
serving expectations.90 This, however, may have different levels 
of meaning. Consider first a group of children playing baseball. If 
a player ran directly from first to third base, without touching 
second, the opposing team would cry out, "That's unfair!" What 
they mean is that the runner attempted to gain an advantage by 
8S See. e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater than the Whole: How Securitiza· 
tion of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital 
Markets to Middle Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 139 (1993) (proposing sale 
of divisible interests in financial assets as innovative and economically desirable way to 
accomplish true sale of assets). 
87 U.C.C. § 9.105(lXi) (emphasis added). 
8S The author recently faced that problem in determining whether promissolj' notes being 
assigned in connection with the securitization of certain payment streams of a home 
relocation company constituted instruments or general intangibles. Although it created extra 
costs, the prudent solution was to perfect in the manner required for both categories of 
collateral. 
S9 See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 622-23 (1975) ("Commercial law ••• deals with a subcommunity 
('merchants') [in the UCC Article 2 context] ••• whose primBlj' rules derive from n sense of 
fairness widespread-if imprecisely dermed-within the commercial community."). 
90 C{. ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 570 (Kaufman Supp. 1994) (asserting 
that "purpose of contract law is to enforce the reasonable expectations ofpnrties induced by 
promises"); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Perfornw.nce and Commercial ReasOTUJbleness 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 666, 669 (1963) (stating that good 
faith obligation serves to prevent party from being "deprived ofhis reD.SOlUlblo expectationsj. 
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violating the rules generally expected of the game. If players could 
arbitrarily change the rules whenever they saw an advantage, or 
if the rules themselves subverted expectations by encouraging 
arbitrary behavior, most people would stop playing the game, and 
for those who continued to play, the game would become chaotic 
and bullying. The same would happen to commercial transactions 
if the law did not promulgate and enforce basic, neutral rules. The 
rules of the game must be respected; furthermore, they should not 
give an undue advantage to either side. 
This principle of playing by neutral rules is recognized in part by 
the UCC's basic good faith requirement requiring "honesty in 
fact.,,91 Honesty in fact does not create a fiduciary relationship or 
general duty of care among parties, and it does not attempt to 
reallocate bargaining power; it requires merely that the parties 
abide by the rules that are agreed to or mandated: 
Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to 
enforce them to the letter, even to the great discom-
fort of their trading partners, without being mulcted 
for lack of [the UCC § 1-201 "honesty in fact" stan-
dard of] "good faith." . . . [K]nowledge that literal 
enforcement means some mismatch between the 
parties' expectation and the outcome does not imply 
a general duty of 'kindness' in performance, or of 
judicial oversight into whether a party had 'good 
cause' to act as it did. Parties to a contract are not 
each others' fiduciaries; they are not bound to treat 
customers with the same consideration reserved for 
their families. Any attempt to add an overlay of~ust 
cause'-as the bankruptcy judge effectively did-to 
91 See u.c.c. § 1-201(19) (1994), which defines "good faith" to mean "honesty in fact in 
the conduct or transaction concerned," and UCC § 1-203, which states that "[elvery contract 
or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce· 
ment." Fairness does not, however, mean that the rules of the game should never change. 
The rules of commercial law, like those of baseball, evolve over time. Bare handa may be 
protected by mitts, and mitts may be extended by webbed pockets, but these changes in rules 
are implemented by common consent of the players. Cf, U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (allowing parties 
to vary UCC provisions by agreement); supra Part m.B (describing constant of flexibility). 
When enough players in enough games play by the changed rules, law revisers should 
consider whether the law itself should be changed. 
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the exercise of contractual privileges would reduce 
commercial certainty [for parties to commercial 
transactions generally - as compared to the "mis-
match" between the expectations and outcome in the 
instant case] and breed costly litigation.92 
935 
There is, however, a second aspect to fairness.93 Again consider 
a group of children playing baseball. The older children decide to 
join together as a team to play against the younger children. That 
does not violate any rules of the game, but the younger children, as 
well as impartial observers in the bleachers, again would cry out, 
"That's unfair!" They now mean that a team consisting of older 
children would gain an advantage over a team consisting of 
younger children because offactors extrinsic to the rules. Although 
this second aspect of fairness is not recognized throughout Article 
9, it is recognized in certain sections of Article 9.94 It is also 
recognized by the additional good faith requirements in other 
articles of the uee that seek to prevent oppression and unfair 
92 Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351,1357 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (refusing to equitably subordinate claims of bank lender that had relied on literal 
terms of its credit agreement in refusing to advance additional funds). Similarly, in 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the 
court emphasized the importance of general commercial predictability over the expectations 
ofparticuIar bondholders by refusing to read into a bond indenture an implied covenant to 
prevent a leveraged buyout. For a contrasting approach, compare KJ.tO., Inc. v. Irving 
Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759-63 (6th Oir. 1986) <holding that obligation of gOO1i faith may 
impose duty on lender to give borrower notice before refusing to advance funds pursuant to 
financing agreement), with which the Seventh Circuit "respectfully disngree[s]." Kham & 
Nate's Shoes No.2, Inc., 908 F.2d at 1358. 
93 Social psychologists also make distinctions between two types offairness: distributive 
and procedural fairness. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & ToM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL 
PsYCHOLOGY OF PRocEDURAL JUSTICE 10-12 (1988) (describing distributive fairness)j id. at 
36-39 (describing basic theory of procedural justice). What is referred to in this Article as 
extrinsic fairness likely would fall under the psychologists' hending of distributive fairness. 
Concerns for expectational and process fairness discussed in this Article likely would be 
included in the psychologists' heading of procedural fairness. See subpart V.D (discussing 
law and psychology of constraints). 
94 E.g., U.O.O. § 9-201 ("Nothing in this Article validates any charge or practice illegal 
under any statute or regulation. ••• ")j § 9-206 (providing that buyer's agreement not to 
assert defenses against assignee is generally valid "[s]ubject to any statute or decision which 
establishes a different rule")j § 9·504(3) (requiring that every aspect of disposition be 
"commercially reasonable"). 
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surprise95 and to require that parties act in accordance with 
"reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. ,,96 
There appear to be two corollaries to fairness. Where the 
extrinsic factors causing one party to have an advantage over 
another could not have been contemplated in advance, courts have 
stepped in to prevent opportunistic behavior. The theory behind 
this tendency is not well articulated, but has similarities to the 
concept of mutual mistake in contract law.97 Courts have held 
that even the basic good faith requirement of "honesty in fact" 
includes this corollary aspect of fairness: 
"Good faith" is a compact reference to an implied 
undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in 
a way that could not have been contemplated at the 
time of drafting, and which therefore was not re-
solved explicitly by the parties .... [It does] not block 
use of terms that actually appear in the contract.98 
Contrast the foregoing corollary, which is similar to mutual 
mistake, with the following corollary which might be characterized 
as "mutual understanding": Implicit rules of conduct sometimes 
may be so generally or universally understood that a court, in 
9S u.c.c. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
00 u.c.c. §§ 2-103(l)(b), 3-103(aX4) cmt. 4. 
97 See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887) (recognizing that mutual 
mistake regarding term material to transaction justifies rescission of contract). Compare the 
view of Goetz and Scott: 
Where the future contingencies are peculiarly intricate or uncertain, 
practical difficulties arise that impede the contracting parties' efforts to 
allocate optimally all risks at the time of contracting. • •• A contract is 
relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing 
important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 
1090-91 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
98 Kham & Nate's Shoes NO.2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (citing the "honesty in fact" standard of good faith under UCC § 1-201(19»; see 
also Neuman v. Pike, 591 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1979) (recognizing implied covenant of fair 
dealing in every contract); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 n.7 (Del. Ch. 1986) 
(recognizing duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by corporation to bondholders as matter 
of contract law); but cf. Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank 
Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503 (1991) (arguing that Kham decision "fails 
to render a thorough analysis of the meaning of 'good faith' under the Code"). 
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effect, takes judicial notice of them to preserve reasonable expecta-
tions of parties to a transaction. Implicit rules might arise from 
widespread courses of dealing in an industry or from a particular 
course of dealing between specific parties.99 The essential element 
is that the expectations created by the course of dealing should be 
objectively apparent to the parties.lOO However, the danger of 
such a doctrine of "mutual understanding" is that, if not used 
sparingly and with circumspection, a court might substitute its 
view of fairness for that of the parties.IOI 
Applying these concepts, it becomes clear that the first aspect of 
fairness, by ignoring extrinsic factors, preserves expectations for 
most parties to commercial transactions. One can read the law, 
know one's rights and obligations, and generally anticipate the 
outcome. The second aspect of fairness, by looking to extrinsic 
factors, may help to preserve the expectations of individuals with 
less bargaining power, but in doing so, thereby makes commercial 
law generally less predictable.lo2 
The corollary aspects of fairness-preventing the parties from 
opportunistically taking advantage of circumstances that could not 
have been contemplated in advance and recognizing universal 
courses of dealing-do not impair the expectations of the parties. 
S9 Indeed, UCC § 1-201(3) defines the "agreement" itself as "the bnrgnin of the parties in 
fact as found in their language or by implicatwn from other circumstances including course 
of dealing" (emphasis added). A "course of dealing'" is defined in UCC § 1-205(1) as -a 
sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular tronsnction which is fairly 
to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding." Thus, under the UCC, the 
second corollary may be unnecessary because the implicit rules are deemed by statute to 
define the contract between the parties. 
100 An example would be an implied representation by a grantor of a security interest that 
the collateral is not already so encumbered as to impair its value and, therefore, destroy the 
benefit of the bargain-similar to an implied warranty of title in selling goods under UCC 
§ 2-312(1). See also Neuman, 591 F.2d at 195 eA promise by the defendants should be 
implied only if the court may rightfully assume that the parties would have included it in 
their written agreement had their attention been called to it. "). 
101 Perhaps that would explain the inconsistent results between the Kham & Nate's Shoes 
No.2, Inc. and KM.C. cases discussed supra note 92. 
102 Another way of thinking about this is to consider that the fll'St aspect of fair-
ness-playing by neutral rules-is similar to justice in other areas of the law. The second 
aspect of fairness-considering external factors-is similar to mercy. Although mercy has 
an important role in cases involving the state against an individual, such as criminal cases, 
it would impede general expectations in arm's length commercial tronsnctions between 
private parties. 
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In the former case, the parties could not have expected the 
circumstance to occur and, therefore, could not have formed 
expectations regarding it. In the latter case, the court merely 
recognizes the parties' mutual understanding. 
The first aspect of fairness, employing neutral rules, raises a 
dilemma when applied to general unsecured creditors, judgment 
and tort creditors, and trade creditors ("Affected Non-Parties"). 
Their rights may be affected by Article 9 secured transactions, but 
they are not themselves parties to such transactions.103 For the 
rules to be neutral, they must not unduly disadvantage any class 
of persons.104 Therefore, either Affected Non-Parties should be 
included in the rulemaking process or the process should take their 
rights into account. It may not always be feasible to include these 
persons in the rulemaking process because one does not always 
know their identity in advance. Companies that ship goods to the 
debtor on credit or people who are later injured by one of the 
debtor's products are examples of classes of persons who may turn 
out to be Affected Non-Parties. Fairness, therefore, requires that 
the rulemaking process consider changes from the standpoint of 
Affected N on-Parties.105 
The second aspect of fairness, considering extrinsic factors such 
as the bargaining power of the parties, is the reason the law 
sometimes distinguishes between parties who are in consumer as 
opposed to non-consumer contexts. In the consumer context, 
fairness is a type of parens patriae concept by which consumers, 
like the younger children in the ballgame, should be protected 
against exploitation because they clearly lack bargaining power or 
adequate information. 
In the non-consumer context, on the other hand, fairness is more 
of an arm's length concept, akin to the UCC's standard of honesty 
103 See supra note 82 (noting that Affected Non-Parties cannot be bound by agreements 
to modify uee provisions). 
104 This statement, of course, begs the question of what is "undue." The answer may 
depend on other policy considerations. For example, if secured credit is believed to stimulate 
the credit markets, and hence the economy, it may not be "undue" to adopt a statute that 
gives an advantage to secured parties over debtors. 
105 This Article shows that applying the constraints helps to achieve fairness in that and 
other regards. 
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in fact.IOS The players are, after all, "big boys and girls," and it 
would be difficult to distinguish or allocate protection among 
them.I07 To attempt to do so would undercut the constraints of 
clarity, flexibility, and consistency. lOS 
D. SIMPLICITY OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Simplicity of implementation also has two aspects. First, it 
should be simple to understand how to apply commercial law. In 
this sense, simplicity is related to the principle of clarity, which 
maintains that the law should be straightforward, unambiguous, 
and clear.I09 Second, the implementation of commercial law 
should be practical and cost-effective. The following examples will 
illustrate the difference. 
As an example of the first aspect of simplicity of implementation, 
consider the original perfection requirements of Article 9. They 
required that financing statements for collateral consisting of 
certain intangibles be filed where the debtor kept records relating 
to those intangibles. no The location of the records had no logical 
connection, however, to the intangibles themselves. The debtor 
could keep the records at its executive offices, at regional offices, or 
even on computers at isolated locations and easily could change the 
location without knowledge or suspicion of the secured party. It 
would be difficult, therefore, to understand in a given situation how 
106 See u.o.o. § 1-203 (1994) (imposing obligation of good faith); U.O.O. § 1-201(19) 
(defining good faith as honesty in fact). 
107 For example, while it may be relatively easy to distinguish a consumer-that is, an 
individual who engages in a transaction for personal, family, or household purposes-from 
a business, should the law attempt to distinguish between small and large businesses? 
Using the baseball analogy, should the law attempt to distinguish amateur, minor, and major 
league players? Small businesses may have no greater sophistication than consumers, but 
because they engage in generic commercial transactions with Inrge businesses, the author 
would favor the preservation of general expectations over any individual expectations 
preserved by such a special standard. 
108 See KURl'VONNEGUT, WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE (1968) (showing absurdity of 
law's requiring absolute extrinsic equality). 
109 See supra Part III.A (discussing constraint of clarity). 
110 See U.O.O. §§ 9-401(4) (providing that rules stated in § 9-103 determine whether filing 
is necessary in state), 9-103(1) (1952) (stating that questions of perfection of security 
interests regarding accounts or contract rights are governed by law of state where related 
records are kept). 
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a secured party could be sure that its security interest was 
perfected. The secured party ultimately might have to rely on 
assurances from the debtor as to the records' location, but if the 
debtor misrepresented the location of the records, either dishonestly 
or by mistakenly moving their location without alerting the secured 
party, the security interest would be unperfected.11l 
As an example of the second aspect of simplicity of implementa-
tion, imagine that, in response to the confusion caused by the 
original Article 9 perfection rule, the law was changed to require 
that financing statements be filed in all 50 states to perfect security 
interests in intangibles. This would avoid the need to determine 
the location of records and would make it simple to understand how 
to perfect. However, it then would become impractical and 
expensive to achieve perfection. 
Simplicity of implementation, therefore, demands that experi-
enced individuals be part of the revision process. One cannot say, 
"make a simple law," any more than one can say, "make a rational 
law." Some legal rules are inherently complex. It is the people 
process itself and the exercise of good judgment that prevent 
distortion, so long as individuals recognize that simplicity of 
implementation is a desirable goal. 
E. CONSISTENCY 
That a law should be internally consistent is taken for granted. 
Commercial law, however, because it governs transactions that 
routinely cross state and national borders, also should be consis-
tent, or at least not inconsistent, with related bodies of law. The 
achievement of uniformity was the most important goal when the 
UCC was originally drafted.112 Prior to that time, commercial 
law was full of contradictions and gaps making commercial practice 
uncertain, time-consuming, and expensive.113 This confrontation 
111 These original perfection requirements, therefore, also undermined fairness by 
subverting expectations. 
112 Mellinkoff, supra note 29, at 223. 
113 Karl Llewellyn noted that commercial law was "extremely scattered, no longer has 
identity, is costly in time to the lawyer, and therefore is costly in money to the business 
man." Llewellyn, supra note 47, at 779. Indeed, inconsistency even has been recognized as 
an evil by a noted, though fictitious, nineteenth·century physician and philosopher, Dr. 
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with multiple, inconsistent legal provisions was frustrating to the 
growth of commercial transactions and to the legal practitioner 
whose advice was sought. 
1. Interstate Consistency, or 'Vniformity". The consistency, or 
"uniformity" as it traditionally has been called, of interstate laws 
was one of the primary goals of the original drafters of the 
UCC.ll4 It is interrelated with two other constraints-clarity and 
simplicity of implementation-because consistent laws are easier 
to understand and to apply. It is obviously satisfied if each state 
adopts changes to Article 9 in their proposed form, without 
modification. Absolute consistency is theoretically possible among 
states, but consistency is subject, as a practical matter, to the 
legislative processes of each state. Thus, true uniformity is difficult 
to achieve. Those who argue for the present structure would 
maintain that the benefits resulting from state variations outweigh 
absolute uniformity and favor a mitigated uniformity.l1ri That 
debate, as well as the debate over whether there should be a 
federal commercial law code, is beyond the scope of this Article.us 
Nonetheless, it should be an underlying goal to attempt to seek 
StephenMaturin: "I am coming to believe that laws are the prime cause of unhappiness •••• 
There are parallel sets onaws in different keys that have nothing to do with one another and 
that are even downright contradictory.- PATRICK O'BRIAN, MASTER AND COMMANDER 318 
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1970). 
U( The central impetus behind the creation of the PEB was to promote unifonnity nmong 
the states. The agreement which originally created the PEB begins: "It shnll be the policy 
of the [Permanent Editorial] Board to assist in attaining and maintaining uniformity in stata 
statutes governing commercial transactions and to this end to approve a minimum number 
of amendments to the Code." See Mooney, supra note 20, at 1349 (quoting Report No.1 of 
the PEB for the U.C.C. (Oct. 31, 1962), 1 U.L.A. XXV, XXVII (1976)}. 
115 State variations indeed may provide the diversity that helps the law evolve, as well 
as serve as a model for future uniform changes. See, for example, California's non·uniform 
inclusion of deposit accounts within Article 9's coverage which presenUy is serving as a 
helpful test case for a possible uniform inclusion of deposit accounts. CAL. U.C.C. § 9· 
302(1}(g},(h} (West 1994). 
118 The author suggests, however, that to the extent the formulation of uniform state laws 
benefits from the participation of private rulemaking groups such as ALI and NCCUSL, 
federal lawmaking also may benefit from the assistance of such groups. For those interested 
in the federalism debate, see, for example, Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting 
Commercial Law for the New Millennium: Will the Current Process SuffiCi!l, 26 LoY. L.A. 
L. REv. 551 (1993) (comparing current UCC adoption process to national commercial code); 
E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., ReCi!nt Developments in Commercial Law: Forward·Federalism or 
Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS L.J. 527 (19BO) (arguing federal involvement 
needed to achieve uniformity in commercial law). 
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interstate uniformity to the extent uniformity can accommodate the 
needs of all states. Proposed changes should be scrutinized as to 
whether they are suited for adoption in all states.117 Lastly, it 
should be noted that, because a change itself may take from five to 
ten years to be adopted by all states,118 any proposed change will 
create at least temporary non-uniformity. 
2. Federal Versus State Consistency. Consistency also means 
that state and federal laws should be congruent.119 Article 9, like 
any other uniform law, is a state-enacted law. The most obvious 
federal laws that impact secured transactions, and therefore come 
into potential conflict with Article 9, include bankruptcy, consumer, 
environmental, railcar and aircraft equipment financing, and 
copyright and intellectual property laws. 
The recent case of BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation120 
illustrates the conflict between state and federal law. The circuit 
courts were split over whether a foreclosure sale that satisfied 
state-law procedures also satisfied the requirement under Section 
548(a)(2) of the Federal Bankruptcy Codel21 that the debtor 
receive "reasonably equivalent value" for transfen·ed property (that 
is, the foreclosed collateral) to ensure that the transfer will not be 
found fraudulent.122 Confusion had arisen because state foreclo-
sure law gave no basis for setting aside a foreclosure sale unless 
the foreclosure procedures are violated or the price is so low as to 
"shock the conscience or raise a presumption of fraud or unfair-
ness."l23 This was arguably inconsistent with federal law's 
117 Private rulemaking bodies should be sensitive not to allow the goal of interstate 
uniformity to exclude other considerations. The proposed New Payments Code is an example 
of rule making that failed because of an overemphasis on uniformity. Supra notes 30·38 and 
accompanying text. A practical consequence of the need for interstate uniformity is that 
private rulemaking probably should avoid highly political areas of law, such as abortion 
rights. Cf. supra note 26 (suggesting that controversial areas oflaw sometimes may not be 
suitable for uniform rulemaking). 
118 The time estimate is based on discussions with several NCCUSL Commissioners. 
119 Cf. Amelia H. Boss & Stephen Veltri, Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code 
Survey: A Plea for Cooperation, 48 Bus. LAw. 1583 (1993) (surveying revisions and federal 
regulation of UCC). 
120 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994). 
121 11 U.S.C. § 548(aX2) (1994). 
122 See 114 S. Ct. at 1760·61 (describing split in circuits). 
123 114 S. Ct. at 1763. 
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requirement of "reasonably equivalent value.,,124 
The Court, in a five to four split, resolved the inconsistency by 
deeming the value of property subject to a foreclosure sale to be 
"worth less,,125 than it would be worth absent the foreclosure: 
We deem ... that ... a "reasonably equivalent 
value," for foreclosed property, is the price in fact 
received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the 
requirements of the State's foreclosure law have been 
complied with.126 
The Court's ruling, however, covered "only mortgage foreclosures of 
real estate,"127 leaving unresolved the question of how UCC 
foreclosures of personal property collateral would be treated under 
the federal fraudulent transfer requirements. Foreclosures of 
personal property, therefore, still could be interpreted inconsistent-
ly with mortgage foreclosures of real estate. 
In considering whether to conform a provision of Article 9 to a 
related federal law, or vice versa, the constraints set forth in this 
Article can be used to assess the proposed change. Furthermore, 
Part IV explains that constraints may be useful in addressing the 
broader question of whether federal and state commercial laws 
should continue to operate side-by-side as independent sources of 
the law covering the same subject matter.128 
124 Id. at 1764. 
125 Id. at 1762. 
126 Id. at 1765. 
127 Id. at 1761 n.3. 
126 Mooney argues that perhaps they should not: 
[V]arious provisions of the U.O.O., and various matters within the scope 
of the U.O.O., have been and continue to be nssnulted by the existence 
of or proposals for non-U.O.O. federal and state laws and regulations. In 
many respects, the impact of these other laws and regulations may do 
more damage to uniformity and predictability in commercial transadions 
than perceived problems in the text of the U.C.C. 
Mooney, supra note 20, at 1351 (emphasis added). Mooney provides ns an example Section 
1324 of the Food Security Act of 1985. This Section repeals the farm products exception to 
UCC § 9-307(1) for certain sales of farm products to a -Iluyer in the ordilUlIY course of 
business": 
[T]he goals, methods, and likely results of section 1324 illustrate the non-
UCC statutory assault • • •• Section 1324 stemmed from a desire to 
facilitate interstate commerce by providing a uniform rule. It will more 
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3. International Consistency. Many secured transactions cross 
national borders. Article 9, therefore, must also accommodate 
foreign bodies oflaw in cross-border secured transactions. The best 
that can presently be hoped for is that the laws will not be 
inconsistent with each other, as there are no international commer-
ciallaw treaties. l29 Consistency with foreign laws does not mean 
that Article 9 should be changed to reflect different and sometimes 
parochial laws. Rather, such inconsistencies need to be addressed 
on a case-by-case basis. However, much of the commercial law of 
nations around the world is remarkably similar. Concepts may be 
called by different names or labels but, in this author's experience, 
the ideas behind commercial law generally are congruent. 
than likely result in a burden to interstate commerce. • •• Although 
even the most pejorative hyperbole is inadequate to fully express what 
section 1324 deserves, the following is a frail attempt: Section 1324 is 
internally inconsistent, unintelligible, and unworkable. It was drafled 
and enacted without apparent knowledge or understanding of present 
and past systems of public notice and secured financing •••• It does not 
draw upon, acknowledge, or include many matters that are adequately 
covered in the U.C.C. . •• It is a disaster. 
Id. at 1351-1352. In addition, federal statutes 
have reordered priorities among unpaid sellers of livestock, meatpackers, 
and purchasers from meatpackers, reordered priorities among unpaid 
sellers of perishable agricultural commodities and other persons in the 
chain of distribution, restricted the sale of goods by foreclosing secured 
parties if the goods were produced in violation of labor standards, ••• 
and established central filing systems for farm products. 
Boss & Veltri, supra note 119, at 1588-89; see also Barkley Clark, Forward: Growing Federal 
Presence in the Law of Secured Transactions, 42 Bus. LAw. 1333 (1987). Many believe that 
the solution to federal-state inconsistency is to enact a federal commercial code. Supra note 
44. But this approach would destroy the ability of states to "experiment" and formulate their 
own solutions to varied problems. The constraints in this Article, however, would allow for 
federalism, while encouraging uniformity, by providing all parties in the business of revising 
commercial law (states, federal government, and those involved in the UCC revision process) 
with a common language for discussion and debate. 
129 There are, however, various private accords currently awaiting ratification by tho 
United States, including the Convention on International Factoring and the Convention on 
International Financial Leasing. See Amelia H. Boss & Patricia B. Fry, Divergent or Parallel 
Tracks: International and Domestic Codification of Commercial Law, 47 Bus. LAw. 1505, 
1510 (1992). In addition, private groups have codified certain international commercial 
practices. For example, the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits is 
sponsored by the International Chamber of Commerce and governs letters of credit in cross-
border and domestic transactions. Id. at 1509-1510. 
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F. COMPLETENESS 
A statute ideally should address the entire subject matter of the 
behavior being regulated. 130 In the commercial law context, 
changes in commercial behavior, emerging market forms, or areas 
impacted or created by new technologies, must be considered as 
they arise. Furthermore, certain areas oflaw that previously were 
not considered within the subject matter of commercial law, such 
as intellectual property, may now fall within commercial law 
because rights thereunder are increasingly being transferred in the 
market place or among third parties. Accordingly, the principle of 
completeness can be important in creating a policy basis for 
statutory change in such circumstances.131 
The need to revise Article 9 due to changes in technology raises 
its own questions. Should the approach to revision be different for 
technologies that change the manner in which commercial transac-
tions are conducted as compared to technologies that affect the 
substantive coverage of commercial law? An example of the former 
would be changes in the way funds are transferred, such as the 
new technology of electronic wire transfers now governed by Article 
4A of the Code. An example of the latter would be the issue of 
obtaining a security interest in a living person's body parts due to 
advances in organ transplant technology. 
Technological advances in the way commercial transactions 
ISO See John L. Gedid, u.c.c. MetJuxlclogy: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 VIM. 
& MARY L. REv. 341, 355. Gedid argues that "(t]he most important attribute of the code 
form is probably orderliness .... Orderliness means the reduction of an entire area oflnw 
to a complete system . • .. [O]rderliness requires that the code provide for keeping the 
subject matter of the statute current and for filling gaps in the statute." rd. Article 9, 
however, does not presently cover all secured transactions. Section 9-104 excludes, for 
example, secured transactions subject to federal statutes, or involving insurance, real estate, 
or deposit accounts. U.O.O. § 9-104(a), (g), (j), (1) (1994) 
131 The constraint of completeness also can create a policy basis to extend Article 9 to 
areas logically within its purview but intentionally lell; uncovered. Patchel notes that 
"concerns about the ultimate goal of enactment restricted the initial &COpe of the Code. Most 
fields [such as insurance] that could be expected to cause political controversy were excluded 
or treated as severable." Patchel, supra note 26, at 98. Patchel quotes Professor James J. 
White to explain that the tendency to avoid political controversy results because NCCUSL 
"lacks the power to cause its legislation to be adopted." rd. at 92. Therefore, the "legislntion 
[that] is appropriate" is the "legislation [that] can be passed." rd. The same statement could 
be applied to any private rulemaking. 
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traditionally are conducted reduce transaction costs and therefore 
tend to be used by parties whether or not the law has developed to 
cover the change. For example, electronic wire transfers are so 
efficient that financial institutions engaged in them prior to the 
adoption of Article 4A, which set forth the parties' rights and 
obligations. At the time Article 4A was approved, the volume of 
wire transfers already had exceeded one trillion dollars per 
day. 132 The need to revise the Code in such circumstances is a 
game of "catch up," to allocate rights and obligations and define 
proper procedures before something goes wrong.133 
Technology changes that affect the substantive coverage of 
commercial law, such as obtaining a security interest in organs and 
other body parts of a living person, can raise fundamental policy 
and ethical questions. In this example, the threshold issue is 
whether such security interests should be permitted. That issue 
transcends commercial law. Only when that issue is resolved can 
one begin to address how to create and perfect the security interest 
under a revision to Article 9. 
The constraint of completeness is indirectly related to consisten-
cy. Without a statute to systematize the law, courts will decide 
cases by reference to statutory provisions that are not necessarily 
designed to cover the subject matter. The result may be the 
development of different common-law rules in different jurisdic-
tions. Article 4A again provides an example: 
[prior to the adoption of Article 4A, there was] no 
comprehensive body of law that defines the rights 
and obligations that arise from wire transfers. . .. 
The result is a great deal of uncertainty. There is no 
consensus about the juridical nature of a wire trans-
132 See U.O.O. § 4A, prefatory note (1994) (discussing electronic wire transfer volume and 
need for legal regulation). 
[d. 
133 [d. The prefatory note states the following: 
Because the dollar amounts involved in funds transfers are so large, the 
risk of loss if something goes wrong in a transaction also may be very 
large. A major policy issue in the drafting of Article 4A is that of 
determining how risk of loss is to be allocated given the price structure 
in the industry. 
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fer and consequently of the right and obligations that 
are created. Article 4A is intended to provide the 
comprehensive body of law that we do not have 
to day. 1M 
947 
There is a second relationship between completeness and 
consistency that also bears noting. Should a statute that is 
"complete" be interpreted by reference to other sources oflaw? The 
answer turns on what is meant by complete. Completeness can 
mean that a judge should look only to the statutory language for 
interpretation, excluding, to the extent feasible,l35 all other 
sources ("absolute completeness"), or it can mean that a judge still 
may consider external sources to help with interpretation ("relative 
completeness"). 
Absolute completeness would enhance consistency by making a 
statute immune to competing concepts. The benefits of referring to 
cases or historical patterns to interpret a statute, however, would 
be lost. Relative completeness, on the other hand, actually would 
undercut statutory consistency by allowing competing concepts to 
be used for interpretation.l36 
Few bodies of law are intended to be absolutely complete. 
Indeed, the UCC recognizes that it does not cover all of commercial 
law, and that pre-Code law may be used for interpretation in those 
instances: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this 
[Code], the principles oflaw and equity, including the law merchant 
... shall supplement its provisions."137 This incorporation into 
the UCC of pre-Code law has fostered some confusion that reflects 
the tension between completeness and consistency. Article 3 of the 
Code provides a better example of the problem than Article 9. 
Section 3-418 is a statutory version of the general restitution 
134 [d. Accord, GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF SrAnrrES 74 (Harv. 
Univ. Press 1982). Calabresi states the following: -As technological demands made ••• 
deviations from the common law more frequent, however, potential conflicts beaune much 
greater. At the same time, the 'shrinking' of America as a result of technological change 
made conflicts all the more dangerous.D [d. 
ISS Statutes are written, of course, in natural language, and therefore, no statute is 
immune from the imprecision that is inherent in natural language. 
138 Taken to its extreme, relative completeness would undermine a statute if judges 
regard the statute as subordinate to these competing concepts. 
137 U.C.C. § 1-103 (1994). 
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principle that applies to the right to recover a mistaken payment 
made under an instrument. Its origins were in the Bills and Notes 
Acts and decisions of the English courts in the Eighteenth Centu-
ry.las A court that broadens the categories of payees against 
whom recovery can be sought would say that it was interpreting 
Section 3-418 consistently with its historical and case law antece-
dents.la9 Under the constraint of completeness, however, that 
court could be criticized for having failed to take account of the way 
that Section 3-418 has displaced pre-Code law and narrowed such 
categories. 
Having identified and defmed the constraints, this Article next 
gives examples of how the constraints can be applied. 
IV. APPLYING THE CONSTRAINTS 
This Section demonstrates how constraints might be applied by 
considering current Article 9 revision proposals and certain 
rulemaking proposals outside of Article 9. The constraints are 
thereby shown to be valuable in examining and testing the 
consequences of statutory rulemaking as well as for revealing 
possible alternative approaches. 
Constraints are significant on several levels. On a basic level, 
they provide a checklistl40 of policy goals and perspectives by 
which rulemaking can be judged and consequences tested. 
Moreover, they provide a means of focusing a large group of diverse 
rulemakers on issues that are fundamental to the body oflaw being 
codified, while simultaneously stimulating multi-dimensional 
thought about those issues. 
138 See, e.g., Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762) (holding that one can recover money 
mistakenly paid under instrument only when other party is at fault). 
139 A statute that addresses a subject previously covered by the common law is presumed 
TWt to change the law absent clear evidence to the contrary. See United Say. Assn. of Tex. 
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988) (explaining that changes 
to existing rules would not likely be made without specific provisions in text of statute); 
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) 
(stating that when Congress intends to change judicially created rules, it makes that intent 
specific); cf. United States v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 1631, 1635 (1993) (declaring that congressio· 
nal legislation includes common-law rules except when statutory purpose to contrary is 
evident). 
140 See Appendix (providing model of basic checklist). 
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Constraints also can make the rulemaking process more efficient 
by introducing a common language, thereby organizing the debate 
and bringing greater coherence and better communication to the 
study and drafting process. A common language is important 
because words help to express concepts, and confusion as to the 
meaning of words often results in confusion as to the concepts 
themselves.141 For example, one of the constraints identified in 
this article is fairness.142 Virtually everyone would agree that a 
statute should be fair, but few would agree on precisely what 
fairness means. As this Article shows, fairness not only has many 
layers of meaning, but also these meanings may be different in an 
Article 9 context than in a general UCC context or in a non-
commercial law context.l43 Real consequences--such as how the 
Code standard of "good faith" should be defined or how consumer 
transactions should be treatedl44-flow from the precise meaning 
of fairness in each context. Constraints give us the precision, and 
therefore the efficiency, of a common language. 
A common language is important for another reason. Some have 
queried whether the constraints are so broad, as categories, that 
they can be used to justify any position the rulemakers wish to 
advance. The categories may be that broad, but the possibility of 
misuse only underscores the importance of precisely defining the 
constraints in light of the fundamental principles and policies of the 
body of law that is the subject of the rulemaking, as was done in 
Part III of this article for Article 9 and commercial law. Indeed, to 
the extent the constraints make explicit what already should be 
141 See. e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamenlal Legal ConceptioTI/JAsApplied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16. 21-35 (1913). Hohfeld states the following: -A 
second reason for the [unfortunate] tendency to confuse or blend non.legnl and legnl 
conceptions consists in the ambiguity and looseness of our legnl terminology.D Id. at 21. 
Even if the difficulty related merely to inadequacy and ambiguity of 
terminology. its seriousness would nevertheless be worthy of definite 
recognition and persistent effon toward improvement; for in any closely 
reasoned problem, whether legal or non-Iegnl, chameleon-hued words are 
a peril both to clear thought and lucid expression. 
Id_ at 28-29. 
142 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (defming fairness). 
143 See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (explaining different aspects offnimess). 
1" Id. 
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implicit in private rulemaking,145 the requirement of precise 
definition actually reduces the ability of rulemakers to misuse 
vague terms-such as fairness-to justify particular results.146 
Constraints also can moderate the influence of interest groups. 
Schwartz and Scott have suggested, for example, that an interest 
group may have more power in private rulemaking than in a public 
legislative process because a public legislator 
can receive messages from knowledgeable parties, or 
she can hold a hearing. Holding a hearing is more 
reliable (documents can be subpoenaed, witnesses 
sworn and cross-examined), but it is more expensive 
because hearings take time. Listening to knowledge-
able parties is cheaper, but is less reliable because 
these informants may have an incentive to misrepre-
sent the truth. . .. A sophisticated [public] legisla-
ture will use both tools so as to maximize the proba-
bility that it is well informed. In contrast, a [private 
rule maker] must rely only on messages ... as to the 
consequences of proposals.147 
The use of constraints, however, would help counterbalance any 
misrepresentations by interest groups by requiring rulemakers to 
judge proposals from a perspective of fundamental, and therefore 
neutral, standards. This would make it more difficult to justify 
rulemaking that is solely the result of capture.148 
146 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (identifying advantages of consciously 
conceptualizing constraints). 
146 Cf. POSNER, supra note 64, at 198-199 (attributing to John Hart Ely view that there 
is a "necessity for tethering constitutional law-in the sense of the body of principles actually 
applied by judges-to the Constitution's text and history, [in contrast to) those who would 
make constitutional law a vehicle for enforcing 'fundamental values' [which) gives judges too 
much discretion"). 
147 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5, at 630. 
148 Cf. Corinne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with the Whores Or Who Is Salling 
the UCC?, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 563, 568·69 (1993). Cooper states the following: 
[L)awyers who have as their main goal to advance the cause of clarity, 
uniformity, and elegance •.. in commercial law and damn the special 
interest oxen which are gored in the process •.• are the keepers of the 
precious flame that is the UCC, and without their persistence, their 
vigilance, their almost religious dedication, the UCC would be nothing 
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Consider, for example, the problem of "truncation" that arose 
during the most recent revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC. 
Under traditional procedures for collection of a bank check, the 
payee presents the check to its own bank for payment. That bank 
then transfers the check, directly or through an intermediary bank, 
to the drawee (or payor) bank. The canceled check ultimately is 
returned to the customer of the drawee bank. Revised Articles 3 
and 4, however, would create a process called truncation, which 
permits only electronic information to be transmitted through the 
bank collection process and, accordingly, entitles the customer to 
electronic information but not the canceled check. 149 
Truncation would save money for banks and, in theory, ultimate-
ly for customers by eliminating the burden of physical delivery of 
checks through the collection process. However, it provides less 
information to customers. During the Articles 3 and 4 revision 
process, a dispute arose as to how much electronic information 
should be provided.150 Those private rulemakers who habitually 
represent banks argued for minimum information-the check 
number and amount and the date of payment-because providing 
more information would require banks to reconfigure their 
automatic processing equipment at considerable cost.151 Academ-
ics participating in the private rulemaking process argued for 
providing more information but were largely ignored.152 
Had the rulemakers been required to act within a framework of 
constraints, they would have been more responsive to the need to 
reach a balanced proposal. The constraints would have required 
them to consider truncation from the perspectives of fundamental 
principles and to justify truncation in light of those principles.l53 
but a patchwork quilt of special interest provisions cobbled together by 
the guys in the blue suits making more for each and every hour of their 
participation than my mortgage payment. 
[d. (footnote omitted). 
149 Rubin, supra note 8, at 754. 
150 [d. at 755-56. 
lSI [d. at 756-57 (noting that rulemakers did not act with malice but. rother, regarded 
banks as trustworthy institutions that would be motivated to please customers). 
152 [d. at 755-56. 
153 The constraints thereby may contribute to c:renting a ·commonly shared set of criteria 
that establish the rules of persuasion" that Professor Rubin observes are fundamental to 
resolving conflicts in fields other than law. [d. at 766. 
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For example, Professor Rubin observes that the fairness arguments 
he made were virtually ignored;l54 requiring rulemakers to 
consider the constraint of fairness would assure that fairness no 
longer could be ignored. 
There is a psychological reason for this. Private rulemakers, at 
least those involved in ALI and NeeUSL, are not lobbyists per se. 
They are lawyers, judges, and academics who are required to 
"[check their] client[s] at the door."155 Nonetheless, at least in the 
case of practicing lawyers, they sometimes identify subconsciously 
with their clients and take on their clients' perspectives: 
[There is a] well-recognized tendency of lawyers to 
identify with their clients. . .. The bank attorneys 
not only identified with their clients . . . but they 
also tended to perceive the underlying structure of 
the situation in the way their clients did. . .. Most 
consumer representatives would have reacted exactly 
the opposite way. ... Their basic allegiance as 
representatives, like the allegiance of bank attorneys, 
not only governs their judgments about appropriate 
solutions but determines their underlying perception 
of the problem to be solved.15s 
The constraints would help to impose on the consciousness of 
rulemakers a more evenhanded perspective, particularly if the 
rulemakers were required to produce a report that justifies 
proposed rules in light of the constraints.157 
The application of constraints also serves another function-it 
helps a statute remain internally consistent. A primary impetus 
for creating the uee or any other uniform state law is to harmo-
nize the law among states and thereby remove conflicting provi-
sions which make conducting business difficult for everybody but 
lawyers. The avoidance of conflicting statutory provisions within 
154 Id. at 756. 
155 Roswell B. Perkins, President's Remarks, 68 A.L.I. PROC. 8, 10 (1991). 
166 Rubin, supra note 8, at 756-57. 
157 See infra Part V.D (analyzing law and psychology of constraints and impact of 
accountability). The constraints would help to shin accountability from a political and ono· 
dimensional audience to one that is more abstmct and multi-dimensional. Id. 
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the UCC itselfis at least as important as the avoidance ofinconsis-
tencies among the laws of different states. Constraints can serve 
to reduce this divergent tendency by providing common ground 
rules to be followed each time rulemaking is considered. 
The following examples will illustrate these ideas. Although the 
application of constraints to these examples suggests possible 
alternatives to the current Article 9 revision proposals, the intent 
of this Part is not to recommend specific rules, but rather to 
illustrate how the constraints might be applied. 
A. SALE OF GENERAL INTANGmLES 
One of the most controversial issues presently debated in the 
revision process is whether Article 9 should be amended to cover 
the sale of general intangibles for the payment of money.l6S 
Article 9 presently covers sales of certain intangibles even though 
sales are not technically secured transactions: "Commercial 
financing on the basis of accounts and chattel paper is often so 
conducted that the distinction between a security transfer and a 
sale is blurred, and a sale of such property is therefore covered by 
[Article 9] whether intended for security or not.nl69 The issue has 
us See PEB REPoRT, supra note 14, at 43-48 (addressing whether sale of general 
intangibles should be covered by Article 9). General intangibles can loosely be thought of as 
intangibles other than accounts (rights to payment for goods sold or leased or services 
rendered), chattel paper (writings that evidence both a monetary obligation and n security 
interest in or lease of specific goods), and negotiable instruments. See U.O.O. §§ 9-105(1){b), 
(i), 9-106 (1994). A right to payment under an ordinary contrnct or under n license or 
franchise agreement would be an example of general intangibles. 
159 U.O.O. § 9-102 cmt. 2 (1994). At the time Article 9 originally was drnfled, the law was 
in a state of flux, with many states modifying the common-law rules governing tronsfers of 
accounts by adopting statutes protecting receivables transfers through filing or other means. 
These modifications were triggered to a significant extent by the Supreme Court's decision 
in Com Exchange Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), which held that 
the assignment of an account without notice to the obligor may be voidable as n bankruptcy 
preference. These statutes covered sales of accounts as well as lonna secured by accounts. 
1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTEREsTs IN PERsoNAL PRQPER'1Y § 8.7, at 275 (1965) ("Pre-
UOO statutes) were typically very broad: transfers which were sales or outright assignments 
were included as well as transfers for security."). The ranson for treating sales and secured 
transactions as one for the purpose of statutory coverage was to provide protections for all 
types of assignments of accounts: "There was an obvious ranson for the inclusion of sales; 
it was necessary to protect [transferees) not only [in) straight accounts receivable fmnncing 
but also [in) arrangements of the factoring type.- Id. § 8.7, at 275 (emphasis added). "Article 
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become important because commercial finance now routinely 
includes the sale of general intangibles, particularly in the 
burgeoning area of securitization. The issue also has generated 
controversy because banks traditionally diversify their loan 
portfolios and, hence, their risks by selling to other banks general 
intangibles consisting of undivided interests, or "participations," in 
their loans.160 The volume of these sales has been enormous, and 
any new perfection requirement (such as Article 9's filing of UCC 
financing _ statements) imposed on the sale of these general 
intangibles would be costly and burdensome to the banking 
industry. 
Application of. the constraints to this proposal indicates that the 
controversy may have little basis. The proposal would enhance 
clarity by eliminating the need to distinguish between, on the one 
hand, accounts and chattel paper whose sale presently is covered 
by Article 9 and, on the other hand, general intangibles whose sale 
(as indicated) is not presently covered. The proposal enhances 
fairness because it would protect the reliance interest of an 
innocent third party buyer of general intangibles without impairing 
the rights of Affected Non-Parties.161 Subject to discussion of 
loan participations, the proposal would appear to enhance signifi-
9 merely follows the pre-Code accounts receivable statutes [covering sales of accounts and 
chattel paper as well as security transfers]." Id. § 10.5, at 308. 
160 Cf. U.C.C. § 9-304 cmt. 1 (perfecting security interest in money or instruments can be 
achieved only by secured party taking possession because it is "universal" practice for the 
secured party to do so). A loan participation, however, is not the transfer of an actual 
instrument but only of an undivided interest therein-hence, a general intangible. 
161 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (defining Affected Non-Parties). This 
Article does not address the more general issue of whether security interests themselves are 
fair or "efficient." See, e.g., David G. Carlson On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. 
L. REv. 2179 (1994) (arguing security interests are efficient); Thomas H. Jackson & Alan 
Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 987 (1985) (rejecting Professor Homer Kripke's theory on efficiency of securing 
interests); Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of 
Commercial Law in a Vacuum ofF act, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985) (using factual inquiry 
to show security interests increase efficiency); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of 
Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984) (rejecting separate arguments made by Professor 
Saul Levmore and Professor James White which defend efficiency of security interests); 
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1986) 
(using relational theory to support efficiency of security interests); Paul M. Shupack, SollJing 
the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067 (1989) (arguing efficiency or 
inefficiency of security interests cannot be determined). 
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cantly simplicity of implementation because it would replace the 
burdensome common-law perfection requirements of obligor 
notification and policing with the simplicity of the UCC filing 
system. Indeed, one of the original purposes of the UCC filing 
system was to avoid the uncertainty and confusion regarding 
common law perfection.l62 
From a consistency standpoint, it makes sense to treat the sale 
of all intangibles-whether accounts, chattel paper, or general 
intangibles-in the same manner. Under existing law, sales of 
general intangibles are treated differently than sales of accounts 
and chattel paper. As to completeness, the sale of general intangi-
bles has become widespread not only in commercial transactions 
but also as a basis of structured finance and asset securitization 
capital market transactions, suggesting the sale should be covered 
by statutory rules. Finally, the proposal enhances flexibility 
because it recognizes that general intangibles are increasingly 
being used in securitization and other innovative commercial 
transactions. Parties to those transactions, however, are unable to 
contract around perfection requirements because contractual 
variations can only bind the parties to the contract. l63 Accord-
ingly, revision of Article 9 itself is the only way to provide such 
flexibility. 164 
Perhaps the only reason not to amend Article 9 to cover the sale 
of general intangibles is that, as mentioned, it may interfere \vith 
the well established practice of banks selling loan participations 
162 See u.c.c. § 9-102 cmt. 2. Cf. SchwllI'CZ, supra note 86, at 31-39. 
163 See supra note 82 (stating that contract and variations only bind contracting parties). 
Because perfection establishes rights against third parties who do not consent, perfection 
requirements may not be varied by contract. 
164 The author previously stated that Article 9 achieves flexibility by approaching secured 
transactions from a conceptual, as opposed to a transactional standpoint. See supra note 80 
and accompanying text. Yet the sale of general intangibles is being addressed from a 
transactional standpoint. Why? The answer is that the sale of intangibles is not 11 secured 
transaction. Certain categories of sale transactions (sales of accounts and chattel papa-) 
already are covered by Article 9, and the sole issue discussed in the text above is whether 
another category-sales of general intangibles for the payment of money-also should be 
covered because it is such an integral part of commercial finance. No one would doubt that. 
secured transactions involving general intangibles already are covered by Article 9. 
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without filing UCC financing statements.165 Filing financing 
statements in such circumstances might well be impractical and 
therefore undermine the principle of simplicity of implementation 
because of the volume of these interbank transactions. At the same 
time, there are no known instances of abuse by reason of not filing. 
Accordingly, as the PEB Report recommends, any change should 
specify that perfection of the sale of loan participations need not 
require the filing of financing statements. Also, any change must 
define loan participations in order to distinguish them from other 
general intangibles, which raises a clarity issue as to how to make 
the distinction. 
Perhaps the distinction used in Section 9-104(0 and Comment 6 
thereto to determine when filing is required to perfect the sale of 
accounts and chattel paper could be used here with equal effect. 
That distinction excludes from the coverage of Article 9 "a sale of 
accounts or chattel paper as part of the sale of the business out of 
which they arose"166 and other sales of accounts and chattel 
paper, "which, by their nature, have nothing to do with commercial 
financing transactions. "167 Sales between banksl68 of loan 
participations have nothing to do with commercial financing 
transactions and therefore could be excluded on the same or a 
similar basis. On balance,169 therefore, the application of con-
straints would support Article 9's coverage of the sale of general 
intangibles for the payment of money. 
165 Therefore, banks should protect their purchases of loan participations by complying 
with any applicable pre-Code common-law requirements for sales of intangibles. Few banlcs 
actually do comply with such common-law requirements, which may involve obligor 
notification or "policing." See supra notes 85-86. If a bank does not comply, then its failure 
to file financing statements under Article 9, ifit applied to sales of loan participations, would 
put it in no worse position than at present. Banks would take the insolvency risk of the 
selling bank, as they likely do now. 
166 U.C.C. § 9-104<0. 
167 U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 6. 
168 For this purpose, the term "bank" might include any financial institution in the 
business of making loans and selling participations therein to allocate risk. The theory of 
the suggested exclusion is that, as between banks and such other financial institutions, 
purchases and sales of loan participations are not intended to facilitate commercial 
transactions but, instead, constitute a means of allocating lending risk between such 
institutions. 
169 The use of the phrase "balance" should not be taken literally. The constraints are not 
intended to have a quantitative ranking or order. The ultimate rulemaking determination 
should be a judgment call by the rulemakers themselves. 
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B. COMMINGLED PROCEEDS 
Proceeds constitute "whatever is received upon the sale, ex-
change, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds.,,170 
The significance of the term is that a security interest generally 
continues in identifiable proceeds, including cash, notwithstanding 
the disposition of the collateral.17l In an "insolvency proceeding" 
(such as bankruptcy),172 however, a special rule applies: A 
security interest that otherwise would continue in cash proceeds 
-will be lost if the cash is commingled, or mixed, with other funds 
of the debtor, except to the extent an artificial formula in Section 
9-306(4) preserves the security interest.173 
The PEB Report proposes that this special rule applying to 
commingled proceeds in the event of a debtor's insolvency proceed-
ings be deleted and replaced by common-law principles of trac-
ing.174 The proposal is intended to eliminate the unfairness to a 
secured party that the artificial formula of UCC Section 9-306(4) 
presently can cause by arbitrarily limiting a perfected security 
interest in commingled cash proceeds. This unfairness can be 
exacerbated where the debtor, in what has become a commonplace 
legal strategy, intentionally commingles proceeds of a perfected 
security interest in advance of filing a bankruptcy petition in order 
to use the formula to defeat the perfected interest. 
The proposal appears neutral from the standpoint of complete-
ness and flexibility. The proposal would enhance consistency by 
making the same rule apply to commingled proceeds both within 
and outside of bankruptcy. The proposal also enhances clarity 
because the results of the present formula are unpredictable. A 
secured creditor could not use the formula to predict the extent of 
its rights in commingled proceeds because a perfected security 
interest therein is "limited to an amount not greater than the 
170 u.c.c. § 9-306(1) (1994). 
In U.C.C. § 9-306(2). See U.C.C. § 9-203(3) (giving secured party rights to p~ds under 
§ 9-306 unless otherwise agreed). The secured party cannot prevent commingling in most 
cases because, consistent with the realities of commerce, § 9-205 of the Code permits the 
debtor to "use, commingle or dispose of ••• collateral ••• or proceeds.· U.C.C. § 9-205. 
172 U.C.C. § 1-201(22). 
173 U.C.C. § 9-306(4Xd)(ii). 
114 PEB REPoRT, supra Dote 10, at 122-25. 
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amount of cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten days 
before the institution of the insolvency proceedings. »176 Such an 
amount, of course, is not ascertainable by a secured creditor until 
after the debtor's bankruptcy. 
The proposal to reinstitute common-law principles of tracing is 
troublesome, however, from the standpoint of simplicity of imple-
mentation. The PEB Report itself recognizes that "[a]rguably, the 
tracing approach may be more difficult and expensive to apply 
[than the formula presently in subsection (4)]» and refers to 
suggestions (which the PEB Report nonetheless questions) "that a 
virtue of [subsection (4)] is the reduced need to 'trace.' »176 
In assessing this proposal, therefore, the increased fairness, 
consistency, and clarity would have to be weighed against the 
difficulty of implementation that results from the application of 
common-law principles of tracing. This suggests the consideration 
of a two-step approach, with the second step only used infrequently. 
The formula in Section 9-306(4) would be retained, and the first 
step would be to apply it to commingled proceeds. In most 
situations, the formula would protect the secured party's interest. 
However, as a means of preserving the secured party's expectations 
and discouraging opportunistic behavior on the part of the debtor, 
the common-law principles of tracing would be reinstituted as a 
second step. This second step, however, would be used only to 
protect the secured party's interest in commingled proceeds that are 
unprotected by the formula. 177 
Such a two-step approach would enhance fairness by discourag-
ing a debtor from intentionally commingling proceeds prior to 
bankruptcy because common-law tracing then would preserve the 
perfected security interest. In most cases where commingling does 
occur, the formula in Section 9-306(4)(d) would protect the secured 
creditor without the need to go through the difficulty and expense 
of actually applying the common-law tracing principles.178 
175 U.C.C. § 9-306(4XdXii). 
176 PEB REPORT, supra note 10, at 124. 
177 Alternatively, the formula in § 9-306(4) could be retained, but a secured party would 
have the option to choose common-law principles of tracing. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1994) 
(providing election option in bankruptcy where certain conditions are met). 
176 One of the reviewers of this Article suggested that a bankruptcy court might requiro 
a secured party claiming an interest in commingled proceeds under existing UCC § 9-306(4) 
either to demonstrate that it would be receiving no more than it would have received under 
common-law tracing or to face a preference claim. Iffederal bankruptcy law is determined 
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c. GOOD FAITH 
Should the definition of "good faith," as used in Article 9, be 
changed?179 Under PEB's proposal, serious consideration would 
be given to adding the extrinsic standard of "the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" to the current 
intrinsic standard of "honesty in fact."lso The proposal is neutral 
from the standpoint of completeness. It would increase consistency 
by harmonizing the Article 9 standard of "good faith" with that 
contained in other Articles of the UCC1S1 as well as the Restate-
ment of Contracts.1S2 It might be perceived as increasing fairness 
by mandating fair dealing as a standard. As shown in the earlier 
to require the application of tracing, then the two-step approach of this Article would not 
simplify matters. However, the author believes that federal bankruptcy law should not 
require tracing; the bankruptcy courts were confusing the relationship under state perfection 
law (i.e., Article 9) between consistency and completeness. C{. U.C.C. § 3-418 (1994) 
(providing state law remedies expressly). Section 9-306(4) is presently intended to displace 
pre-Code law. Therefore, perfection of commingled proceeds is not presently governed by 
common-law tracing, and nothing in federal preference law, 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994), would 
reinstitute tracing for a security interest that is perfected under applicable state law. 
119 PEB REPoRT, supra note 10, at 248-49. 
lBO Id. at 248. 
181 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 3-103(a)(4) cmt. 4 (defIning good faith). The auilior has 
severe doubts, however, whether ilie "fair dealing" standard should have ever been exported 
out of Article 2 to Articles 3, 4, and 4A. See U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c), 4A·105{a)(6) 
(using -eair dealing" standard). The Article 2 standard applies only "in the case of a 
merchant." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b). Merchants have been described as -a subcommunity ••• 
whose primary rules derive from a sense of fairness widespread. D Danzig, supra note 89, at 
622-23. They engage in a high volume of undifferentiated transactions involving goods, often 
without sophisticated contracts. Therefore, the fair dealing standard helps preserve ilie 
relationship of trust that is essential to permit the smooth functioning of such trnnsnctions. 
Other articles of the Code work differently. AI; will be discussed, Article 9 in particular 
involves sophisticated contracts and non-trusting parties. Infra note 185 and accompanying 
text. 
182 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACl'S § 205 (1979) (providing duty of good faith 
and fair dealing derived from UCC Article 2 fair dealing requirement). However, the fair 
dealing concept in the Restatement may have an objective basis, similar to this article's 
second corollary to fairness, because it addresses whether an action would -violate 
community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." Id. at cmt. a. (emphasis 
added). This raises the question of how standards are determined. In a uce Article 2 
context, the community is limited to merchants. In an Article 9 context, it is less clear 
whether a coherent "community" exists. Cf. Farnsworth, supra note 90, at 671-72 (noting 
that "good faith performance can be measured by an objective standard based on ilie decency, 
fairness or reasonableness of the community, commercial or oilierwise, of which one is a 
member."). 
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discussion of fairness, however, this proposal would preserve the 
expectations of parties with less bargaining power while diminish-
ing expectations of parties to Article 9 transactions generally. 
Furthermore, its imposition would undercut clarity because there 
will always be a prior judgment call on whether a particular action 
constitutes fair dealing.l83 In addition, the corollary aspects of 
fairness-preventing opportunistic behavior where extrinsic factors 
could not have been contemplated in advance and recognizing 
implicit rules of conduct that arise from widespread courses of 
dealing in an industry or from particular courses of dealing 
between specific parties1B4-already are read into the law by 
courts. The net result of the proposal therefore would be to 
diminish clarity while not materially increasing fairness. 
Secured transactions under Article 9, by their nature, are arm's 
length transactions where the parties do not start from a relation 
of mutual comfort. The transactions are secured by collateral 
because the secured party is uncomfortable with the debtor's 
unsecured credit. This is different from the "between merchants" 
grounding of Article 2, where merchants routinely ship goods, often 
183 "[F]air dealing is a broad tenn that must be defined in context .•.. " U.C.C. § 3·103 
cmt. 4; see also Christina L. Kunz, Frontispiece on Good Faith: A Functional Approach 
Within the UCC, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1105, 1109·1110 (1990). Kunz states the 
following: 
[The inclusion of fair dealing within the UCC's definition of good faith 
adds] very little certainty to the law, because the meaning of "good faith" 
must be further established in each litigated case by proof of these 
"reasonable commercial standards" or "reasonable standards," as well as 
"fair dealing." . .. In fact, as a commercial litigator bitterly complained 
at a recent ABA meeting, the use of good faith in the UCC seems to 
invite disputes and litigation, as well as increase attorney fees and the 
need for expert witness' testimony. 
Id. Prof. Kunz nonetheless believes there is credibility to the point of view that some 
uncertainty can increase socially desirable behavior by motivating parties to act within the 
range of clearly acceptable behavior: 
Except in the tiny percentage of commercial cases that end up in the 
court system, parties may well be motivated to act well within the 
bounds of good faith, in order to avoid having to pay the costs associated 
with litigating good faith definitions and applications. As in other 
portions of the UCC, uncertainty probably "depolarizes" the disputing 
parties and brings them back to the middle-to the negotiating table. 
Id. at 1110. 
l8t See supra notes 97·101 and accompanying text (describing corollary aspects offairness 
as akin to "mutual mistake" and "mutual underatanding"). 
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without extensive supporting documentation. l85 The volume of 
sales transactions creates a marketplace in goods that is made . 
more efficient by implied standards of fair dealing. The transac-
tion-by-transaction nature of Article 9, on the other hand, puts 
greater weight on the negotiated terms of the security agreement 
and the expectations of the secured creditor that it will have a 
means of being repaid if the debtor defaults. 
Recall the baseball analogy previously used in this Article to 
illustrate the principle of good faith. ISS With limited exceptions, 
Article 9 presently requires only that the parties play by neutral 
rules. The proposed additional requirement of fair dealing would 
prevent parties in Article 9 transactions from attempting to gain 
undue advantage over each other. The question is, however, 
whether the law should impose such a parens patriae standard 
where the parties, having adequate information and not lacking 
bargaining power, are "big boys and girlS."l87 Given that the 
imposition of this subjective standard would undercut clarity, 
flexibility, and simplicityl88 and that the parties already are held 
to an "honesty in fact" standard, this analysis at least questions 
185 In discussing the tension between legislative clarity and standards such as -good 
faith," Professor Lon Fuller notes that -[i]n commerciallnw, ••• requirements of 'fairness' 
can take on definiteness of meaning from a body of commercial practice and from the 
principles of conduct shared by a community of traders." Fuu.ER, supra note 25, at 64. The 
author believes that Professor Fuller's view was limited to communities of merchants, such 
as under Article 2 of the UCC, and not to secured (and therefore nontrusting) trnnsuctions, 
under Article 9. 
185 See supra notes 90·92 and accompanying text (explaining necessity of neutral rules 
to insure fairness in commercial transactions). 
187 By way of comparison, even the federal Trust Indenture Act (TIA), which mandntes 
appointment of a trustee to act as agent for holders of publicly issued debt securities (the 
proverbial '\vidows and orphans"), only requires the trustee to perform ministerial 
contractually agreed upon duties until the obligor defaults on the securities: -(Plrior to 
default, ••• the indenture trustee shall not be liable except for the performance of such 
duties as are specifically set out in such indenture." 15 U.S.C. § 77000(a)(l) (1981 & SUppa 
1995). Even after a default, the trustee's duties to the security holders are limited to acting 
with the "same degree of care and skill ••• as a prudent man would exercise or use under 
the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs." 15 U.S.C. § 77000(c). 
188 Because fair dealing is a subjective determination that depends on the circumstances 
of the parties and their particular transaction, its imposition would undercut clarity. 
Flexibility would be undercut because fair dealing would limit the ability under UCC § 1-
102(3) to vary the provisions of Article 9 by agreement of the parties. Implementation DUly 
become more difficult or costly because alternatives would have to be scrutinized to avoid 
actions that might not constitute fair dealing. 
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whether its adoption is generally compelling.la9 On the other 
hand, it may be appropriate to consider adopting this standard for 
consumer transactions because consumers, in general, are relatively 
unsophisticated and individually have little negotiating power, and 
consumer transactions are relatively easy to distinguish. 
D. PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST COMPETING PRIORITIES 
Article 9 grants special protection to persons who extend secured 
credit to enable debtors to purchase identifiable assets.190 Such 
a purchase money security interest ("PMSI,,)19l entitles its holder 
to priority over a secured creditor who previously had obtained a 
security interest in the debtor's after-acquired property192 and 
therefore has been described as "a device for alleviating the 
situational monopoly created by an after-acquired property 
clause.,,193 
There is an ambiguity under Article 9, however, as to the relative 
priority, as between themselves, of the following PMSI creditors:194 
a seller of property who finances a portion of the sale by taking 
back an installment note (or other evidence of purchase money 
189 The foregoing analysis of good faith is not intended to be dispositive of the issue of 
"fair dealing"j rather, it illustrates how the constraints can be applied. For a thoughtful 
analysis of why good faith should include fair dealing, see Donald J. Rapson, Who is Looking 
Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in the Light (and 
Shadows) of Professor Rubin's Observations, 28 LoY. LA L. REv. 249 (1994) (examining 
UCC's revision process and its ability to serve public interest and suggesting reforms). 
190 See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAw OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNlFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 'iI 3.01[2][e], at 3-5 (2d ed. 1988) (describing special protection of purchase 
money security interests). 
191 The UCC defit)es a PMSI to include the se.curity interest of either a seller on credit 
or a lender who finances the purchase. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1994) (discussing priority of security 
interests). 
192 U.C.C. § 9-312(3)-(4). 
193 Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among 
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167 (1979). 
1M The PEB Report notes that 
[e]ach [of such PMSI creditors] has some reason to believe that it enjoys 
flrBt priority and, as a practical matter, in many cases it is likely that a 
purchase money secured party will be unable to discover the filing (or, 
in the case of consumer goods, the automatically perfected security 
interest) of its competitor. 
PEB REpORT, supra note 10, at 105. 
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debt) secured by the sold property (a '"}JMSI Selle!"") and a lender 
who advances funds to the buyer of the property to enable the 
buyer to pay the downpayment and then secures the loan by the 
purchased property (a "PMSI Lende!""). The PEB Report recom-
mends that Section 9-312 be revised to resolve this ambiguity by 
providing that these creditors receive pari passu, or pro rata, 
treatment on account of their PMSr.195 
How would the constraints apply to resolve the relative priority 
of a PMSI Seller and a PMSI Lender? From the standpoint of 
clarity, the PEB's proposal is favorable because it would establish 
a rule that eliminates the present ambiguity and, once the rule is 
known, preserves the expectations of these parties. The proposal 
appears neutral as to flexibility, consistency, and completeness. 
The proposal is troublesome, however, from the standpoint of 
simplicity of implementation. Creditors with pari passu security 
interests can exercise remedies with respect to the collateral, 
thereby affecting the rights and impairing the expectations of the 
other creditors. The PEB Report itself recognizes this problem: 
"[T]he [Study] Committee acknowledges that a rule of equal priority 
may create complications when one secured party tries to enforce 
its security interest."l96 In practice, where two or more creditors 
have security interests in the same collateral, they negotiate and 
enter into an "intercreditor agreement" that sets forth their rights 
and remedies as to the collateral. In the case of a PMSI, however, 
an intercreditor agreement is unlikely to be practical. Other than 
in a situation ofPMSI financing of expensive equipment, the PMSI 
Seller and the PMSI Lender customarily would not negotiate with 
each other. Each party deals separately with the buyer, and in 
some instances, they are not aware of the other's existence.l97 
Furthermore, the cost of negotiating an intercreditor agreement for 
195 PEB REPORT, supra note 10, at 105. Barkley Clark has suggested that, because the 
existing law is ambiguous, pari passu treatment is the result -more consistent with both 
letter and spirit of § 9-312." CLARK, supra note 190, 'iI 3.09[5J, at 3·120. Even assuming that 
is the equitable result under existing law, it does not control how the law should be changed 
to resolve the ambiguity and reallocate the expectations of the parties. 
196 PEB REPORT, supra note 10, at 105. 
197 If the PAISI Seller and the PMSI Lender were in privity of contract, one might argue 
that a pan passu rule would force them to accept the shared priority or reallOOlte priorities 
by negotiation. 
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each PMSI transaction, even if it could be done, would be prohibi-
tively high.19B 
If the PEB's proposal of pari passu treatment is accepted, the 
constraints suggest that simplicity of implementation still must be 
preserved. For example, Article 9 can be revised to specify how the 
PMSI Seller and PMSI Lender may exercise their respective 
remedies, perhaps inspired by examining to what parties to actual 
intercreditor agreements have tended to agree.199 The parties 
would be free under Section 1-102(3) to vary the rule if they so 
desired. 
Examining the PEB's proposal from the standpoint of fairness 
suggests even other approaches. Fairness (in its first aspect) 
requires neutral rules, or at least rules that do not give an undue 
advantage to any party. A pari passu interest may give an undue 
advantage to a PMSI Seller over a PMSI Lender in a way that 
could discourage PMSI lending. As the following numerical 
example shows, a pari passu interest will always result in a 
significantly greater loss for the PMSI Lender than for the PMSI 
Seller. 
Consider, for example, a buyer who wishes to purchase a 
computer for $10,000. The seller is willing to finance $7,000 of the 
purchase price by taking back an installment sales note. A local 
bank is willing to lend the buyer the remaining $3,000 if it receives 
a purchase money security interest in the computer. The cost to 
the seller of manufacturing the computer, or otherwise acquiring it 
for sale, is $6,500. 
The PMSI Lender in this example justifiably expects to recover 
its loan plus interest because the value of the collateral greatly 
exceeds the amount of the loan. On the other hand, if even $1 of 
principal on the loan were not repaid, the PMSI Lender would 
suffer a loss.2OO Its profit factor derives from payment of interest 
198 In the author's experience, intercreditor agreements are among the most sophisticated 
and hotly negotiated of financing agreements. 
199 Cf. U.C.C. § 9·315(2) cmt. 4 (addressing competing pari passu security interests in 
goods that become part of product or mass). 
200 This is actually a simplification because interest represents both a profit factor and 
a return of costs. Also, the use of the term "loss," here and with regard to the PMSI Seller, 
is not quite precise because even the' failure to recover an anticipated profit can be 
characterized as a loss. Nonetheless, the comparative analysis should be valid. 
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and not from repayment of principal. Accordingly, if the purchaser 
defaults on his obligations and, as is inevitable, the $10,000 
computer is worth less than that amount in foreclosure, the PMSI 
Lender not only will fail to recover its anticipated profit (i.e., 
interest) but also will suffer a direct loss on its investment. 
In contrast, the PMSI Seller in this example may not recover its 
full profit but is far less likely to suffer a loss, and whatever loss is 
suffered would be significantly less than that suffered by the PMSI 
Lender. For example, if the foreclosure sale value of the computer 
collateral were $6,000, then under the PEB's proposal of pari passu 
sharing, the PMSI Lender would recover $1,800 on account of its 
$3,000 loan and the PMSI Seller would recover $4,200.201 There-
fore, the PMSI Lender would suffer a loss of $1,200.202 The PMSI 
Seller, on the other hand, not only would not suffer a loss but 
would recover a profit of $700! This profit arises because the PMSI 
Seller's cost of the computer is $6,500; it already has been paid 
$3,000 as a down payment from the proceeds of the PMSI Lenders 
original loan (reducing its unpaid cost to $3,500), and it now 
recovers $4,200 from the foreclosure sale. 
The PEB's proposed rule, therefore, could be viewed as unfair 
because it unduly disadvantages PMSI Lenders. There are two 
ways to mitigate this unfairness. One way would be to calculate 
pari passu sharing based on the PMSI Sellers unpaid cost of goods 
and not on the sale price. This approach would undercut simplicity 
of implementation, however, because it would require the expense 
and delay of a hearing to determine the cost of the goods. Even 
more troublesome, a PMSI Lender could not always know the cost 
in advance and, therefore, would be unable to assess its position. 
Another way to mitigate this unfairness and preserve simplicity of 
implementation would be to give priority to PMSI Lenders over 
PMSI Sellers.203 Although this approach would give an advan-
tage to the PMSI Lender, the advantage may not be undue given 
that the proceeds of PMSI loans are paid to PMSI Sellers and that 
201 That is, $6,000 foreclosure proceeds multiplied by the PMSI Lender's pari passu 30% 
interest and the PMSI Seller's pari passu 70% interest. 
202 That is, the $3,000 loan minus the $1,800 recovery. 
203 The PAISI Lender would not be required to notify the PMSI Seller. IT the PMSI Seller 
is paid a down payment, it should assume the possibility of a PMSI Lender, and it can 
always inquire of the buyer in cases of doubt. 
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such loans permit buyers to finance downpayments that facilitate 
the ability of PMSI Sellers to continue to sell their products.204 
There is, however, one further wrinkle to this problem. The 
PMSI Seller could have sold its installment note to a third party, 
such as a finance company, to acquire funds.205 The third party 
(referred to herein as the "PMSI Factor") then would enjoy the 
purchase money priority of the PMSI Seller.206 This raises the 
issue of whether the PMSI Lender should have priority over the 
PMSI Factor. 
This analysis at least suggests that the PMSI Lender should 
have priority. The rule would be clear and simple to implement: 
Any PMSI Factor would know its interest in the collateral is 
subordinate to a PMSI Lender and, therefore, would be able to 
negotiate a discount to the purchase price of the installment note 
in appropriate cases.207 Thus, to accord priority to the PMSI 
Lender also would be fair because the PMSI Factor would pay less 
than par value for the note. Furthermore, to change the priority of 
the installment note based on who is the holder-the PMSI Seller 
or the PMSI Factor-would undercut consistency.2os 
204 The foregoing analysis recognizes loss or gain for the PMSI Seller as a single entity, 
taking into account its combined roles as seller and financier. The counterargument would 
be that fairness should be judged for a PMSI Seller by viewing only its role as financier, 
irrespective of its role as seller. That argument may not be persuasive, however, because 
the PMSI Seller provides purchase money financing primarily as a means of inducing, and 
thereby profiting by, the sale. From a flexibility standpoint, however, it would be interesting 
to observe whether giving the PMSI Lender priority over the PMSI Seller would cause PMSI 
Sellers not to sell unless PMSI Lenders agree, under UCC § 1-102(3), to convert their senior 
positions into pari passu positions. 
205 Such a sale would be routine for PMSI Sellers that need immediate cash to replenish 
inventory and make new sales. Depending on how the sale is structured, and whether 
capital market funding is involved, it may be termed factoring, securitization, or some 
hybrid. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L. Bus. & 
FIN. 133, 144-46 (1994) (comparing securitization and factoring). 
206 See U.C.C. § 9-107 cmt. 1 (explaining that "[a] financing agency has a purchase money 
security interest when it advances money to the [PMSI] seller, taking back an assignment 
of chattel paper [i.e., the installment note] ... "). 
2t17 An appropriate case would exist where the combined PMSI claims of the PMSI Seller 
and the PMSI Lender exceeded the expected liquidation value of the collateral. The PMSI 
Factor could require such information before purchasing the installment note. 
203 Holders in due course of instruments are the only persons to whom the Code presently 
accords greater rights than the original holder of the instrument. See U.C.C. § 3·302 cmt. 
4 (1994) (discussing defInition and rights of holder in due course). The PMSI Factor would 
not be similar to a holder in due course because it would be deemed to know that a PMSI 
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E. FORECLOSURE STANDARD 
Should the "safe harbor" given by Section 9-504 to secured 
parties who foreclose in a "commercially reasonable" manner be 
changed to ensure that the debtor obtains a market price for its 
property given as collateral? This possible change, not proposed in 
the PEB Report but under discussion at the suggestion ofindividu-
al PEB members,209 is neutral from the standpoint of consistency, 
completeness, and flexibility. It would enhance the first aspect of 
the principle of fairness by attempting to ensure that the debtor 
obtains a market price for its collateral, but it would seriously 
undermine the constraints of clarity and simplicity by depriving a 
secured party of the procedural "safe harbor" presently provided by 
uee Section 9-504 in a foreclosure. Given that the debtor is not 
an Affected Non_party,210 this suggested change may not be 
compelling.211 
F. FILING IN DEBTOR'S LOCATION 
Should Section 9-103 be amended to look to the debtor's location, 
not the location of the collateral, for filing in all cases (other than 
possessory security interests)?212 Adoption of this proposal 
generally would (subject to the discussion below) enhance clarity 
and simplicity of implementation by eliminating the need to 
Lender always has priority. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2) (stating holder in due course is one who 
takes without notice of another's claim to instrument). 
209 See, e.g., Donald J. Rapson, Repurchase (of Collaleral?) Agreements and the Larger 
Issue of Deficiency Actions: What Does Section 9·504(5) Mean?, 29lDAHO L. REv. 649 (1992-
93) (interpreting meaning of § 9-504(5) and suggesting possible revisions to subsection). 
210 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (defining Affected Non·Party). 
211 Cf. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. ct. 1757 (1994) (concerning Chapter 11 
debtor who brought action contending price received at foreclosure sale WIlS less than 
"reasonably equivalent value" of property). The Supreme Court held that in a (non·UCC) 
mortgage foreclosure, as long as all the requirements of the State's foreclosure law have been 
complied with ,,[mlarket value cannot be the criterion." Id. at 1761. The Court emphasized 
that "the law has always deemed that a fair and proper price ••• is the price in fact received 
at the foreclosure sale." Id. at 1765. The Court ruled that the federal fraudulent transfer 
requirement of "reasonably equivalent value" under 11 U.S.C. § 548(0)(2) WIlS deemed 
satisfied by a properly performed state foreclosure sale. [d. 
212 PEB REPoRT, supra note 10, at 74-78. UCC § 9-103 presently requires filing where 
the collateral is located for most tangible items of collateral and filing where the debtor is 
located for accounts and other intangibles and for mobile goods. U.C.C. § 9-103 (1994). 
968 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:909 
determine the location of each collateral item213 and also, equally, 
if not more importantly, by eliminating the need to refile financing 
statements in new jurisdictions where the items of collateral are 
moved.214 Furthermore, this proposal would be neutral as to 
fairness. Regarding consistency, the proposal would minimize 
certain priority problems by having one filing location. Moreover, 
once adopted by all states (after a period of admitted inconsistency, 
during which filings could be made both in the debtor's jurisdiction 
and in the jurisdictions where the collateral is located), there would 
be consistency among states as to filings. Finally, the proposal 
would be neutral as to completeness and flexibility. 
In considering this proposal, however, the method of determining 
the location of a small business should be addressed from the 
standpoints of clarity and simplicity ofimplementation. In this age 
where personal computers and telefaxes permit executives to work 
at home, bricks and mortar no longer are the sole determinants of 
a company's location. Furthermore, it sometimes may be costly to 
verify the location of a small business or to monitor whether the 
business remains in that location. These constraints, therefore, 
indicate a need for either a distinction in determining the location 
of filing for small businesses and other debtors or, alternatively, a 
common location of filing for all debtors.215 
G. FILING SYSTEM 
How would the constraints apply to the problems inherent in the 
filing system? In assessing the existing uee scheme for filing 
financing statements, one is confronted by a state-by-state filing 
system that is not entirely computerized and as to which different 
213 Determining the location of collateral sometimes can be highly confusing. See, e.g., 
In re L.M.S. Assocs., Inc., 18 B.R. 425 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (determining loca.tion of 
collateral consisting ofinventory of gift shops aboard ships that had moved through several 
jurisdictions both domestic and foreign). 
214 U.O.O. § 9-103(IXd). Of course, debtors move also, although usually less ofton than 
collateral. When such a move occurs, financing statements must be refiled. U.O.O. § 9-
103(3Xe). 
215 Examples of possible locations of debtor's filings include the state of the debtor's 
organization or, politically more sensitive, a central single national location or database. 
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states have different forms and requirements.216 When closing an 
actual transaction, this often makes it difficult to know in advance 
what adverse financing statements may be on file. The need to 
deal with multiple filing offices is costly and logistically inefficient. 
In short, the present filing system lacks clarity, simplicity, and 
consistency. 
Suppose, for example, that a secured party has made a loan to a 
debtor and wishes to perfect a security interest in the debtor's 
accounts. Under UCC Section 9-103(3), the law of the state in 
which the debtor has its chief executive office (or place of business 
if only one) governs perfection. Under UCC Section 9-401(1), 
however, different states can choose differing requirements for 
where to file financing statements, including whether to require 
local county filings (in addition to central filings in the office of the 
applicable Secretary of State). Because the central state filing is 
required anyway, it is unclear what benefit the local county filing 
provides except to enrich county filing officers and to create a trap 
for the unwary secured party who forgets to file locally. 
Once financing statements are presented for filing "lith the 
proper fee or accepted by the filing officer, the filing is effective.217 
A filing is not, however, immediately recorded in a manner that a 
search will disclose; in the author's experience, recording delays of 
weeks, or in some cases even months, are common. Such a delay 
creates the dilemma that searches of filing records218 sometimes 
will not reveal previously filed, but as yet unrecorded, financing 
statements; yet, the previously filed financing statements will take 
priority over those later filed by a secured party in good faith.219 
This often motivates the duplicative and expensive search for 
adverse financing statements at the outset of a transaction, then 
filing prior to the closing, and again searching for adverse financing 
statements weeks or months later to ensure that no such adverse 
statements would take priority by reason of previously having been 
filed but not recorded. 
216 See Julianna J. Zekan, The Name Game-Playing to Win Under Seclion 9402 of the 
Unifonn Commercial Code, 19 HoFSTRA. L. REv. 365 (1990-91) (arguing UCC hils generated 
extensive and uncertain litigation resulting from non-uniform prectices nod decisions). 
217 U.C.C. § 9-403(1). 
218 See U.C.C. § 9-403(4) (ouUining manner in which fmnocing statements must be rued). 
216 See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) ("Conflicting security interests rank Ilccording to priority ••• 
from the time a filing is first made covering the collilternl .• ). 
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The constraint of flexibility-particularly to adapt to changes in 
technology-calls for an improved filing system that takes advan-
tage of the computer technology that has developed largely since 
the manual filing system originally was proposed by the UCC in 
the 1950's. Furthermore, a central filing system to which all states 
subscribe would obviate the need to search on a state-by-state basis 
and greatly reduce the filing and searching burden. 
In short, the application of constraints to the fIling system 
problems not only would help to articulate solutions but also could 
be useful in establishing a policy basis to help overcome any 
political inertia or opposition to change.22o 
H. PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTEREST IN INSTRUMENTS 
Should filing be permitted for perfection of a security interest in 
an instrument?221 This proposal would allow, for example, a 
practical means of perfection in securitization transactions 
involving pools of notes or other instruments. Under present law, 
the only way to perfect such a security interest is by the secured 
party's taking possession of the instruments.222 
Perfecting by filing would significantly enhance the simplicity of 
these transactions. In assessing the proposal, however, its fairness 
would have to be weighed from the standpoint of a third party who, 
unaware of the filing, pays money to purchase one or more of the 
instruments. Furthermore, the impact of perfecting an interest in 
negotiable instruments by fIling would have to be harmonized, from 
the standpoint of consistency, with other areas of commercial law 
involving negotiability. 223 
In discussing this proposal, the PEB Report indirectly addresses 
fairness and consistency. It recommends that "holders in due 
course and certain other good faith purchasers for value who take 
possession would be senior to security interests earlier perfected by 
22Q An example of possible political inertia or opposition to change includes the opposition 
by employees in county clerk offices. 
221 PEB REPORT, supra note 10, at 152·55. 
222 U.C.C. § 9.304(1) (1994). 
223 This proposal is consistent, however, with U.C.C. § 9·304(1) (providing that security 
interests in chattel paper or negotiable documents may be perfected by filing). 
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filing.,,224 This solution also upholds simplicity because, as the 
PEB Report points out, "secured creditors in many [finance] 
transactions may view [the debtor's voluntary transfer of instru-
ments to third parties in breach of contractual restrictions on 
transfer] as a remote possibility that is not of serious concern.,,225 
I. FEDERAL VERSUS STATE PERFECTION 
How would the constraints apply to the question previously 
raised in this Article of whether federal and state commercial law 
should continue to operate side-by-side covering the same subject 
matter? Consider this from the standpoint of railcar financing. 
Under the constraint of consistency, separate federal and state 
commercial laws should not cover the same subject matter--e.g., 
perfection of a security interest in railcars-in different ways. 
Having only one means of perfection also would enhance clarity and 
simplicity of implementation by making the law more straightfor-
ward as well as reducing the burden and cost of complying with 
duplicative perfection requirements. The constraints of fairness 
and flexibility are neutral on this question. 
From the standpoint of completeness, it would not appear to 
matter whether federal and state law jointly govern so long as 
together they create a complete system for perfecting the security 
interest. Nonetheless, if from the standpoints of consistency, 
clarity, and simplicity it is better to have only one governing body 
of law, then completeness requires that the body of law that is 
chosen be comprehensive in its application. 
At present, Article 9 has a better track record than federal law 
in covering the perfection of secured transactions. Furthermore, 
from the standpoint of internal consistency, most secured transac-
tions presently are governed by Article 9. Therefore, the Article 9 
method for perfection of a security interest in railcars-filing 
financing statements for the railcars as mobile goods-would be 
more consistent with the greater body of secured transactions than 
would perfection requirements under federallaw.226 
224 PEB REPORT, supra note 10, at 155. Those persons would be Affected Non-Parties. 
C{. U.C.C. § 9-308 (containing similar rule regarding chattel paper). 
22S Id. 
22SWhether federal law or the UCC would be the more appropriate governing law in other 
circumstances would require, of course, a case-by-case analysis. 
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J. ORIGINAL ADOPTION OF ARTICLE 9 
Some may contend that the application of constraints depends on 
Article 9 being a mature and widely accepted body of law. This 
theory can be tested, however, by applying the constraints to the 
original adoption of Article 9, which made radical and innovative 
changes to the then existing law of secured transactions. Pre-
Article 9 law was unclear, complex, and impractical. Its separate 
rules for different types of secured transactions created troublesome 
inconsistencies, while rigid common-law forms of perfection greatly 
hindered flexibility and the ability to innovate. Furthermore, 
although some laws were uniform among states, others were not, 
creating significant inconsistencies. The constraints, therefore, 
would have provided a compelling basis for the original adoption of 
Article 9. 
K. AN EXAMPLE OUTSIDE OF ARTICLE 9 
As an example of the use of constraints not involving Article 9 
rulemaking, consider an ongoing controversy of whether to change 
governmental forfeiture statutes to recognize the rights of creditors 
in business forfeitures: 
Forfeiture laws, which allow the Government to 
[seize] any assets that are reasonably traceable to a 
crime, . . . do not adequately shield . . . unsecured 
creditors. 
Caught in the web of ... seizure are many inno-
cent creditors, from major financial institutions [that 
have made loans] to ... suppliers of goods and 
services .... 
In [business] forfeitures, unsecured creditors have 
virtually no way to become informed about or to 
contest matters affecting their interests. Prosecutors 
notify them intermittently, at best, about the prog-
ress of the case. Unlike unsecured creditors in a 
bankruptcy case, unsecured creditors in a forfeiture 
. .. are not guaranteed payment from seized as-
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sets.'JZ1 
One recommendation to address this concern was that the 
government's seizure of assets in a business forfeiture be subordi-
nate to the interests and claims of innocent parties but senior to 
claims and interests of wrongdoers.228 The intention was to 
balance the rights of government prosecutors with those of innocent 
creditors, while still taking the profit out of crime.229 This recom-
mendation was opposed, however, by government prosecutors. The 
prosecutors were unfamiliar with creditors' rights law, and their 
objections apparently reflected a misunderstanding of the is-
sues.230 
The use of constraints would not necessarily dictate the accep-
tance of the recommendation. However, it would have allowed the 
recommendation and its consequences to be evaluated on a more 
informed and objective basis, permitting greater consideration of 
the recommendation's various benefits. 
One such benefit includes the recommendation's increase in 
clarity by permitting unsecured creditors to know their rights, 
whether such rights are tested in a bankruptcy or forfeiture 
context. This is particularly important because, from the stand-
2Z1 Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan E. Rothman, Save tJw Blameless {rom the Seizure Laws, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, § 3, at 11. See generally Steven L. Schwo.n:z & Alan E. Rothman, 
Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of Commercial Law?, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 287 (1993) 
(providing more complete analysis of forfeiture law and its impact on creditors' rights). 
228 See Schwarcz & Rothman, Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of Commercial Law?, supra 
note 227, at 317-18 (stating recommendation addressing concern of whether to change 
governmental forfeiture statutes to recognize rights of creclitors in business forfeitures); ide 
at 318 n.226 (providing basis for recommendation). 
228 Id. 
2SO As reported to the author by several NCCUSL Commissioners. C{. Schwo.n:z & 
Rothman, Save the Blameless {rom Seizure Laws, supra note 227, at 11. Schwo.n:z and 
Rothman state the following: 
Id. 
The fortunes of unsecured creditors sit right in the bands of prosecutors, 
who too often given them litUe attention. Why? Because prosecutors 
focus primarily on criminal investigations, not commercial matters, and 
••• are not likely to want to deal with a multitude of creclitors unrelnted 
to the illegalities of a case. And prosecutors are seldom eopbisticnted in 
business. 
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point of unsecured creditors, forfeitures are completely random.231 
By the same token, prosecutors would be able to know that, as 
against wrongdoers, the government's seizure would be just as 
effective as under existing law because the subordination would 
only protect innocent parties. 
From the standpoints of flexibility and completeness, the 
recommendation is neutral. The recommendation decreases 
simplicity somewhat because existing law gives all rights to the 
government whereas the recommendation would require the 
government to be subordinate to the rights of unsecured creditors. 
Subordination, however, is widely used in commercial and bank-
ruptcy law,232 and its application to forfeiture would be consistent 
with customary usage. 
The recommendation enhances fairness by preserving the 
expectations both of the government under forfeiture law and of 
creditors under non-forfeiture law. Because creditors are Affected 
Non-Parties under forfeiture law-their rights are affected although 
they are not themselves parties to the wrongdoing giving rise to 
forfeiture actions-forfeiture law has inadvertently ignored their 
claims. The recommendation, by subordinating the government's 
claim against seized assets to claims of innocent creditors, acknow-
ledges that making loans and supplying trade credit are legitimate 
business activities.233 At the same time, the recommendation 
continues to recognize the government's right under forfeiture law 
to seize a wrongdoer's assets and thereby completely deprive the 
231 Schwarcz & Rothman, Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of Commercial Law? supra 
note 227, at 303, 315. Schwarcz and Rothman state as follows: 
ld. 
It is, of course, impossible at the time of the [decision to extend 
unsecured credit] to estimate the likelihood of civil forfeiture because the 
underlying illicit action that may give rise to the forfeiture is as yet 
undiscovered, and also because the bringing of such action is politically 
determined. Lenders and other creditors have no means to predict how, 
when or if a borrower's assets might be seized ••.• 
232 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 510 (1994) (stating subordination agreement is enforceable in 
bankruptcy to same extent enforceable under non-banlrnIptcy law); U.C.C. § 9-316 
(permitting entity entitled to priority to subordinate its interest by agreement); see also 
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 569 (1971) (providing model 
subordination language for bonds and debentures). 
233 Schwarcz & Rothman, Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of Commercial Law?, supra 
note 227, at 319. 
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wrongdoer of any profits from its crime. 
Forfeiture law also is inconsistent with bankruptcy law. The 
recommendation would make these bodies of law consistent by 
giving unsecured creditors in a forfeiture many of the rights they 
would have in a bankruptcy case: 
In a civil forfeiture action, an unsecured creditor 
has virtually no procedural mechanisms through 
which to become informed and contest matters 
affecting its interests .... 
In comparison, under federal bankruptcy law, all 
creditors are notified and [participate directly or 
through a representative creditors' committee in the 
proceeding] .... 
Civil forfeiture does not recognize unsecured credi-
tors as having claims as of right .... 
· .. This is contrary to bankruptcy law .... 
· . . [l]n bankruptcy, the claims of unsecured 
creditors are superior to any governmental claims [in 
certain circumstances] ... 
· .. The policy question raised, again, is whether in 
a commercial context conflicting bodies oflaw should 
be allowed to govern the same subject matter, 
especially when, from the standpoint of innocent 
third parties, the determination of which body oflaw 
applies to a given situation is random.234 
Constraints, therefore, could help prosecutors understand why 
rights and interests of innocent parties should be respected in a 
forfeiture and would provide a more objective basis by which 
rulemakers could judge the consequences of the recommendation. 
234 Id. at 304-0S, 311 (footnotes omitted). See generally id. at 303·1S (describing historical 
grounds of civil forfeiture, its development into current law, Wld tension between forfeiture 
law and commercial and bankruptcy law). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Irish poets, learn your trade, 
Sing whatever is well made . ... 235 
A. CONSTRAINTS APPLIED TO PRIVATE RULEMAKING 
Constraints are fundamental to the private rulemaking process 
because they make explicit the considerations that ought to be 
implicit in any good rulemaking. They focus the process by 
providing a basis to judge proposed rules and their consequences, 
and they stimulate consideration of viable alternative approaches. 
They make the process more efficient by introducing the precision 
of a common language and more rigorous by requiring rulemakers 
to use that language.236 Constraints also make private rulemak-
ing less susceptible to lobbying influence by providing neutral stan-
dards to counterbalance interest group politics. 
It is true that, without reference to constraints, private rulemak-
ing now often produces rules that are consistent with the con-
straints. This does not make the constraints superfluous. Explicit 
consideration of constraints would improve the process of private 
rulemaking whether or not its product demonstrates that con-
straints have been present implicitly. Even the best of private 
rulemakers are imperfect and fallible human beings; bringing the 
constraints into consciousness would ensure that no constraint has 
been overlooked. Furthermore, requiring rulemakers to focus on 
questions raised by the constraints is likely to reveal hidden 
connections and stimulate new ways of thinking about the problem 
235 W.B. YEATS, Urukr Ben Bulben (1939), in YEATS'S POEMS 449, 451 (A. Nonnan JefTares 
ed., MacMillan London Ltd., 1989). 
235 This raises the question of whether there should be an institutional enforcement 
mechanism that mandates the application of constraints. For example, private rulemaking 
reports, such as those issued by the study and drafting committees, e.g. PEB REPORT, supra 
note 10, could explicitly be required to justify proposed rules and potential alternatives in 
light of the constraints. Such a requirement would be addressed politically by ALI, 
NCCUSL, and other private rulemaking bodies. 
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being addressed.237 In short, the constraints increase the likeli-
hood that the rulemaking process will result in a well-made 
statute. 
Constraints also can give greater legitimacy to the private 
rulemaking process. The problem oflegitimacy in private rulemak-
ing is a bit like the Wizard of Oz. When human beings are seen to 
be behind the process-as has happened with the rulemaking 
process becoming increasingly open to public participation-the 
"authority of the source imposing" law weakens.238 Furthermore, 
subsequent legislative ratification, through enactment, of uniform 
state laws is ultimately unsatisfying as a basis of legitimacy 
because state legislatures do not always exercise, and indeed the 
goal of uniformity discourages, independent scrutiny.239 
Iflegitimacy does not derive from the rulemaking source, then it 
must derive from some other aspect of the process or not at all. 
Habermas has shown that "legal norms are ... open to criticism 
and in need of justification [such as through] a morality grounded 
237 This Article suggests, for example, that rulemakers consider retaining the formula in 
UCC § 9-306(4) for commingled cash proceeds of debtors in insolvency proceedinge and that 
common-law principles of tracing be instituted only as a second step to be used to protect a 
secured party's interest that is unprotected by the formula. See supra notes 170-178 and 
accompanying text (discussing commingled proceeds and alternative proposal for treatment 
of them). The definition of good faith should not necessarily be changed to add "the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" to the current standard of 
"honesty in fact." See supra notes 179-189 and accompanying text (discussing good faith). 
The ambiguous competing priorities of a PMSI Seller and a PMSI Lender under UCC §§ 9-
3l2(3) and (4) should not be made pari passu, but instead, the PMSI Lender perhnps should 
be given priority over the PMSI Seller. See supra notes 190-208 and accompanying text 
(discussing priority between competing purchase money security interests). The -safe 
harbor" given by UCC § 9-504 to secured parties who follow UCC procedural requirements 
in foreclosing should not necessarily be changed to ensure that the debtor obtains a market 
price for its property given as collateral. See supra notes 209·211 and accompanying text 
(discussing foreclosure standard). Finally, the application of constraints to examine problems 
inherent in the filing system would help not only to articulate solutions, but also to establish 
a policy basis to help overcome opposition to change. See supra notes 216-220 and 
accompanying text (discussing filing system). The author defers to ALI and NCCUSL to 
determine whether these proposals would be better. The point is that new ways ofthlnking 
about the problem were stimulated by the application of COrultraints. 
238 Cf. 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF CoMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REAsoN AND mE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY' 266 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (quoting Mnx Weber and 
discussing sources ofIegitimacy). 
239 See, e.g., infra note 253 (providing example oflack of scrutiny in adopting legislation). 
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on principles. "240 This Article posits that legitimacy can derive, 
at least in part, from the application of constraints that are 
intended to reflect fundamental principles-as Habermas would put 
it, "justification by principles whose validity could in turn be criti-
cized."241 
Constraints also can give legitimacy to the rulemaking process by 
approximating the benefits of widespread participation. No 
rulemaking-much less private rulemaking-ever can be wholly 
participatory. Even with "open" meetings, there are practical and 
logistical limitations on the number of participants that can be 
included in a working session.242 Some parties, such as consumer 
groups, may be unable to afford the time or monetary cost of 
attending numerous meetings at different geographical loca-
tions.243 Moreover, other persons-the so-called Affected Non-
Parties-will be unaware (except in retrospect) of the rule's impact 
on them. 
Participation, however, has two goals: to elicit the perspectives 
of all affected parties and to create a forum where those perspec-
tives and their consequences can be debated. Because constraints 
require rulemakers to consider a variety of perspectives and their 
consequences, constraints effectively serve to achieve some, if not 
all, of the same goals that would be obtained by increasing the 
participatory nature of the private rulemaking process. Constraints 
also focus rulemakers on consequences to Affected Non-parties, 
whereas a participatory process is unlikely to include them. 
Constraints, therefore, may be even more "participatory," in effect, 
than open meetings because constraints take Affected Non-Parties 
into account. 
In analyzing the application of constraints as a means of 
240 HABERMAS, supra note 238, at 260-61. 
241 [d. at 264. 
242 Harry Sigman, a noted commercial law scholar, practitioner, and member of the 
Article 9 drafting committee, suggested to the author that private rulemaking could be made 
more participatory by opening the process to the public at an earlier stage. One should be 
wary, however, of making the process logistically unworkable, or of inviting interest group 
politics at a more impressionable stage. Cf. Patchel, supra note 26, at 146 (exploring impact 
of interest groups on uniform laws process). 
243 Even conference calls can be costly. For example, the author recently received an $890 
telephone bill for a one-hour conference call among nine parties-not all of whom were long 
distance. 
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increasing the participatory nature of private rulemaking, it is 
useful to compare ALI and NCCUSL to the hypothetical "semirep-
resentative body" that Professor Guido Calabresi, facing similar 
issues of legitimacy, considers as a possible approach to dealing 
with "the problem of legal obsolescence.,,244 Calabresi defines 
legal obsolescence as the 
combination of lack of fit and lack of current legisla-
tive support [that results] . . . because a statute is 
hard to revise once it is passed. [Therefore,] laws 
are governing us that would not and could not be 
enacted today, and ... some of these laws not only 
could not be reenacted but also do not fit, [and 
therefore] are in some sense inconsistent with, our 
whole legal landscape.245 
Calabresi maintains that obsolescence must be overcome,246 but 
the hard decision is how to accomplish that institutionally: 
We are bound in the end to choose whether updating 
by an institution [which he later calls a semirepre-
sentative body] that has a fairly good sense of 
current majoritarian feelings, but is not bound by 
principles in its decision making, is preferable to 
updating by courts, which are good at discerning 
changes in the legal landscapes but which, we are 
still assuming, have no great capacity for evaluating 
current popular desires.247 
Calabresi chooses the courts as the institution best suited in the 
first instance to overcome statutory obsolescence.248 His reason-
2« CALABRESI, supra note 134, at 2. 
=Id. 
:us Id. at 110. 
247 Id. at 110 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
:us Id. at 119. Calabresi focused on which institution-the courts, the legislD.tures, or 
administrative agencies-is best suited to overcome the ~urden of inertin- by initiating 
statutory revision. He would choose the courts for two reasons: fU"St, a court. as a body, is 
better suited to commence ajudicial.legislative dialogue; second, a court decides cases on the 
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ing, however, also would lend support to the choice of a semirepre-
sentative body that is bound by principles in its decisionmak-
ing-not unlike a private rulemaking body such as ALlor 
NCCUSL249 that undertakes to be bound by the application of 
constraints. Calabresi concludes that the primary basis of judicial 
lawmaking authority derives from the principled nature of judicial 
decisionmaking and the approximation of the popular will that 
legal principles represent: 
Most classic justifications of judicial common law 
power . . . emphasize the subservience of courts to 
principles, to rational decision making, . . . as ex-
plaining and justifying judicial lawmaking power .... 
[B]ut [this] leaves unanswered the crucial issue: 
what there is about principles of law ... and about 
rational decision making which suggests that a body, 
selected for its capacity to discern these principles 
and to act rationally on them, should make the 
conditional rules for society .... 250 The answer 
must lie in the belief that the legal fabric, and the 
principles that form it, are good approximations of 
one aspect of the popular will, of what a majority in 
basis of principles although at the expense ofm!\ioritarian wishes at the first instance. Id. 
at 124. Thus, Calabresi is arguing that, all things being equal, it is better for the courts to 
directly attack laws which they feel are obsolete and to revise them, using legal principles, 
in the manner they believe best fits the legal landscape, and then allow the legislatures, if 
dissatisfied, to come back and overturn or revise them. 
249 Calabresi contemplated the semirepresentative body to be governmental: uan 
administrative agency or a legislative or executive committee." Id. at 118. Neither the PEB, 
nor ALI or NCCUSL, is strictly governmental. Professor Patchel states that although 
NCCUSL 
is representative of the states •.. in the sense that it draws its member-
ship from them[,] ... [t]he states have no official control over its proce-
dures or over the subject matter of the laws it promulgates, and its 
members do not view themselves as official representatives of their 
states' interests in the process. Indeed, the primary defining characteris-
tic of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
is that it is neither a democratically elected representative body, nor one 
owing allegiance, or having any accountability, to any political body. 
Patchel, supra note 26, at 91. Also, ALI is a private institution although it is dedicated to 
the public interest. 
260 CALABRESI, supra note 134, at 96. 
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some sense desires.251 
... [L]egal principles ... reflect a deeper popular 
will. That is still the primary basis for judicial 
lawmaking authority. Unprincipled decisions, ad hoc 
rules that do not fit, remain in a sense outside the 
pale and subject to criticism.252 
981 
Applying the constraints to private rulemaking would make the 
process more principled'1.53-and therefore more reflective of the 
popular will-to the extent the constraints incorporate fundamental 
251 [d. at 96-97 (emphasis added). An earlier draft or this Article was subtiUed, -A 
Bickelian Approach to Statutory Drafting and Obsolescence: based upon the author's belief 
that constraints reflecting legal principles will not only be mnjoritarinn (as Cnlnbresi 
suggests) but also will reflect consensus, and that the authority orIaw derives from a process 
that is reflective of consensus. See ALExANDER lit BICKEL, THE MoRAUT'l OF CONSENT 
(1975) (arguing that broad constitutional principles become entrenched only as they gather 
common assent). 
252 CALABRESI, supra note 134, at 113. Cf. Patchel, supra note 26, at 146 (asserting that 
NCCUSL, in uniform law process, obtains legitimacy ror its laws not from its demoerntic 
origina but from neutraIity of its drafters and nonpolitical nature or drafting process and 
later questioning whether interest group politics has prevented process rrom n!nlly being 
neutral and nonpolitical). [d. Requiring proposed statutory revisions to be judged in light 
of the constraints of this Article would enhance the perception, and hoperully the reality, that 
the process would be more neutral and less political 
253 It is not enough to say that private rulemaking gains all or its legitimacy from 
subsequent legislative enactment. Once specific rules are proposed, the momentum created 
sometimes can overcome the democratic control imposed by the requirement or legislative 
enactment. For example, Donald Rapson, see supra note 34 (noting other details or 
conversation with Rapson), and Neil Cohen, a proressor of commercial law at Brooklyn Law 
School and the reporter for the Restatement orGuarantees and Suretyahip, told the author 
that Professor Cohen was teaching a course in Article 9 when a student Il8ked whether New 
Jersey had adopted the 1972 amendments. Cohen replied that it had not. The student 
called his father, a senior member of the New Jersey legislature, and Il8ked why the 1972 
amendments had not been adopted. The father then asked the legislature's drafting office 
to present the amendments to his committee ror possible legislative adoption, and Rapson 
was asked to testify in support of the amendments at a legislative hearing. When Rapson 
arriv~ he was directed to read verbatim the amendments ror the record, starting with tha 
definitions section. Droning on while the committee enacted other business, he had not even 
completed the definitions before he was thanked, asked to stop, and informed that the 
amendments would be adopted without modification. See also Patchel, supra note 26,at 158. 
Patcbelsuggeats that state legislatures need clear explanations of-the mnjor policy choices 
that have been made-and the alternative choices that have been rejectedD in proposals for 
uniform legislation. [d. The constraints identified in this Article can be used to help explain 
those choices. 
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legal principles.254 
This Article has discussed constraints primarily in the commer-
cial law context. The author believes that the categories of 
constraints identified in this Article have generic validity. The 
meaning or interpretation of each category might differ, however, 
for different bodies of law. To use an obvious example, the 
constraint of fairness should be understood differently for legisla-
tion involving child custody or deceptive trade practices than for 
commercial law. Consideration should be given to how constraints 
can be defined and applied to rulemaking in other areas of raw. 
B. CONSTRAINTS APPLIED TO PUBLIC RULEMAKING 
The focus of this Article has been on private rulemaking. This 
focus should not obscure the fact that constraints also can be 
applied to public rulemaking. Although a complete discussion of 
that application is beyond the scope of this Article, many of the 
virtues that constraints bring to private rulemaking, such as the 
precision of a common language and a conceptual basis to judge the 
consequences of rulemaking proposals, could have equal applicabil-
ity to the public legislative process. 
Furthermore, a legislature does not always consider the perspec-
tives of all parties potentially affected by its laws; the legitimacy of 
its laws derives instead from the representative composition of its 
members.255 Just as with private rulemaking, the use of con-
straints would help to ensure that the interests of all parties, 
including Affected Non-Parties, are considered in the public 
legislative process. Constraints could be used, for example, to 
explain "the major Degislative] policy choices that have been 
254 See infra notes 259-269 and accompanying text (discussing how constraints correlate 
to principles used in judicial decisionmaking). Calabresi regards legal principles as tho 
judge's own sense of right and wrong and the popular will, as constrained by tho fabric of 
past common-law decisions: 
[E]achjudge inevitably brings to the task some sense of the mlijority that 
selected him or her and some sense of what is right for the country •••• 
But the judge does not directly seek to apply his or her sense of the 
popular will or of right and wrong except as it seems to fit in the fabric. 
CALABRESI, supra note 134, at 97. 
2M Patchel, supra note 26, at 158. 
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made-and the alternative choices that have been rejected."256 
Constraints also may be useful in enhancing the principled basis 
of admjnjstrative rulemaking.2!i7 Because admjnjstrative rule-
making is constrained by the statute pursuant to which the rule is 
to be adopted, the statute itself could mandate the application of 
constraints as part of the rulemaking process.25S 
C. CONSTRAINTS APPLIED TO JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
The use of constraints in judicial decisionmaking, particularly 
regarding issues of statutory interpretation, also may merit study. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to fully explore the 
application of constraints to judicial decisionmaking, a few 
observations may be in order. 
In interpreting a statute, courts implicitly look to the principles 
underlying the statute to reach their decision. For example, in 
Security National Bank & Trust Co. v. Dentsply Professional 
Plan,259 the court relied on clarity and consistency to refuse to 
reinstate a creditor's security interest to the priority lost by the 
release of its UCC financing statement in ignorance of another 
creditor's security interest. The court stated the following: 
25S [d. The use of constraints to explain legislative policy choices would also further the 
legislature's goal of ensuring that its enactments are enforced by the executive and 
interpre~ by the courts according to the legislature's intention. 
257 CALABRESI, supra-note 134, at 96-97,110,113. 
25S Federal administrative rulemaking also could be mandated by Executive Order, such 
as now is done by requiring cost-benefit analyses in certain circumstances. See. e.g., Exec. 
Order No. 12,291,3 C.F.R. 127 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,866,3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) (suc:ces3{)r 
to Exec. Order No. 12,291). Under Executive Order No. 12,291, for example, all federal 
government agencies are required, in connection with promulgating new regulations, 
reviewing existing regulations, and developing legislative proposnla concerning regulations, 
to weigh the costs and benefits. Exec. Order No. 12,291,3 C.F.R. at 128. Specificnlly, an 
agency must, except in emergency situations, base its rulemaking actions on "adequate 
information concerning the need for and consequences of" the action; an action may not be 
taken unless its potential benefits outweigh its potential costs, and actions shall be chosen 
among alternatives to maximize net benefits and minimize net costs to society. [d. at 128. 
Furthermore, the agency must consider lower cost alternative approaches in promulgating 
"major rules," and must prepare a "Regulatory Impact Analysis" ns the basis of such 
consideration. [d. The author is only mentioning this ns a possible analogy and is not 
necessarily recommending that the same bureaucratic formality apply to the application of 
constraints to administrative rulemaking. 
25S 617 P.2d 1340 (Olda. 1980). 
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Although strict adherence to the Code requirements 
may at times lead to harsh results, efforts by courts 
to fashion equitable solutions for mitigation of 
hardships experienced by creditors in the literal 
application of statutory filing requirements may have 
the undesirable effect of reducing the degree of 
reliance the market place should be able to place on 
the Code provisions. The inevitable harm doubtless 
would be more serious to commerce than the occa-
sional harshness from strict obedience. "260 
One might ask: What about fairness? As this Article has shown, 
the aspect of fairness that applies to Article 9 transactions is a 
concept of "honesty in fact," or playing by neutral rules.261 As so 
defined, fairness was respected. 
The Dentsply case illustrates that to the extent constraints are 
relevant to statutory rulemaking, they also may have relevance in 
guiding a judge in the interpretation of a statute. In this regard, 
legislative history showing the application of constraints to the 
statute might be useful.262 
Constraints also may be useful to help judges articulate the 
"principled" basis of common-law decisionmaking. At least five of 
the constraints appear to have similarities to principles used in 
judicial decisionmaking.263 Clarity has as much application in 
deciding cases as in making rules. Several judges have expressed 
260 [d. at 1343. 
281 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of fairness in 
commercial transactions). 
262 Constraints could be included in legislative history or, in appropriate cases, even in 
a statute's statement of purpose or policy. Cf. U.C.O. § 1-102 (1994) (stating purpose of 
Uniform Commercial Code). Cf. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision 
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395,400 
(1950). Llewellyn states that "[i]f a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of 
some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is 
nonsense." [d. 
283 This is not to say that the constraints embody all of the principles used in judicial 
decisionmaking. Stare decisis, for example, is technically outside of any single constraint 
with the possible exception of consistency, as discussed below. Nonetheless, the cumulative 
effect of the constraints, by binding rulemakers to consider rulemaking in light of 
fundamental principles, would provide a measure of continuity in decisionmaking that is not 
dissimilar to stare decisis. 
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to the author the desirability of deciding cases in ways that parties 
will know what is expected of them and the consequences of their 
actions.264 Fairness, of course, is generally viewed as a principle 
underlying judicial decisionmaking. Simplicity of implementation 
certainly would appear to be a judicial goal. Consistency may be 
less important because judges usually decide cases based on the 
particular facts before them and want the flexibility (a constraint, 
but here used to refer to the decisionmaker as opposed to the 
parties) to decide different cases differently. The Dentsply case, 
however, illustrates that, at least in situations (such as commercial 
transactions) where clarity is important, consistency will be 
respected to the extent it helps to preserve clarity. Furthermore, 
consistency would ensure that a judicial determination is scruti-
nized from the standpoint of consistency with the general body of 
law, and to that extent, consistency is similar to (although not as 
rigid as) the judicial principle of stare decisis.2S5 
The constraint of flexibility is tricky. As mentioned above,judges 
want flexibility in deciding cases. Because the constraints high-
light competing considerations, they can help a judge articulate 
how different results can be reached in different cases. On the 
other hand, to the extent the constraint of flexibility itself is 
relevant to judicial decisionmaking, it probably would focus on 
whether a judge recognizes evolving customs and usages and the 
ability of parties to contract around impediments. That focus is 
more clearly desirable for commercial law cases than for other 
areas oflaw. 
The final constraint, completeness, appears to have less applica-
tion to common-law judicial decisionmaking. Courts deal \'1ith the 
specific matters before them and often strive to resolve only those 
issues and to avoid making rules that are unnecessary to decide the 
2Sf For example, at a recent ALI luncheon, Judge Jean C. Hamilton of the federnl district 
court in St. Louis remarked to the author that from ajudiciaI perspective it is essential that 
people be able to pIan their actions in accordance with clear legal rules. That ability, she 
observed, is all too often lacking in the legal system today. 
265 See supra note 263 (regarding cumulative effect of constraints as being not dissimilar 
to stare decisis). 
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case.266 That seems logical because court decisions, unlike rules 
made by private rulemaking bodies or legislatures, are typically 
made by individual judges who have little access to the information 
or resources that would enable them to reach decisions of general 
application. The role of the judge is to do justice in the case before 
her, not to promulgate rules of general application. 
It should be observed that judges are unlikely to have as much 
time or resources as legislatures to rigorously apply constraints to 
each decision they make267 or to decide what each constraint 
means in the context of reaching judicial determinations under 
different bodies of law.268 Furthermore, because judges are 
already bound to a principled decisionmaking process,269 they do 
not need constraints to the extent that private rulemakers may 
need them. The role of constraints in common-law judicial 
decisionmaking is therefore more likely to remain implicit than to 
become explicit. 
D. LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CONSTRAINTS 
The private rulemaking process ultimately involves the interac-
tion among people in a group. It is therefore relevant to ask how 
the constraints would be viewed from the standpoint of the 
psychology of group behavior. Within this context, the issue of 
accountability is especially salient.27o 
266 Indeed, judicial statements that are not necessary to decide the case are referred to 
as "dicta" and are not accorded the same precedential authority as statements that are 
necessary to decide the case. 
267 Judges, however, could require litigants to include in their briefs to the court a 
discussion of the application of constraints to the litigated facts. 
268 As mentioned above, the meaning or interpretation of each category of constraint 
might differ for different bodies oflaw. 
2S9 See CALABRESI, supra note 134, at 96-97 (noting "the way judges are trained and 
selected, their relative independence, the limitations imposed on their stoff, the fact that 
they make law incrementally in response to specific situations, and the requirement that 
they explain the grounds of their decisions."). 
270 The author addressed this question to three scholars who are nationally prominent for 
their research into the psychology of group behavior: Professor John M. Levine of the 
University of Pittsburgh; Professor Reid Hastie of the University of Colorado at Boulder 
Institute of Cognitive Science, Center for Research on Judgment and Policy; and Dr. Marvin 
Aronson, Director of the Postgraduate Center for Mental Health. Each of these scholars was 
kind enough to review a draft of this Article in preparation for responding to the question. 
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In general, people work harder to accomplish a perceived goal 
when they feel they are accountable to an authority or an interest 
groUp.271 Under the existing rulemaking process, there is already 
a form of accountability of the rulemakers to their constituent 
organizations-ALI and NCCUSL-as well as (indirectly) to 
segments of the legal community affected by the rulemaking 
changes. Psychological research has shown, however, that people 
often will adopt positions to gain the favor of those to whom they 
feel accountable.272 To that extent, this somewhat narrow ac-
countability is not necessarily good because it prevents people from 
becoming multi-dimensional, flexible thinkers about problems.273 
The constraints can help overcome this limitation by stimulating 
more flexible thought. When people know nothing about their 
prospective audience, they tend to think through issues more 
carefully to anticipate objections.274 The constraints affect this 
process in two ways. First, the nature of the constraints creates a 
broader accountability by shifting the audience from one that is 
purely political and one-dimensional to one that is more abstract 
and multi-dimensional. Second, the content of the constraints 
provokes flexible thought by requiring rulemakers to consider 
competing considerations. 
Furthermore, psychological research has confirmed that people 
are often excessively confident in the correctness of their views.275 
The constraints, by forcing rulemakers to view proposals from 
different perspectives, can help to overcome that bias. In this 
connection, it is noteworthy that rulemakers would have knowledge 
of the constraints at the beginning of the revision process. 
Research shows that accountability before initial consideration of 
an issue is necessary to "prevent first impressions from dominating 
final judgments."276 Thus, introduction of the constraints at the 
271 Discussions with Professors Levine and Hastie. 
272 Philip E. Tetlock. The Impact of Accounrobility on Judgment and Choice: Toward a 
Social Contingency Model, in 25 ADVANCES IN ExPERThlENTAL SOCIAL PsYCHOLOGY 331,341 
(Academic Press 1992). 
273 See id. at 346 (noting that accountability leads to least common denominator 
responses). The author thanks Elana S. Teitelman, Columbia Law School '96, for helpful 
comments on this section of the Article. 
27' J.d. at 343, 351. 
275 Id. at 356. 
276 Id. at 353-54. 
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onset will ensure that rulemakers remain open minded. 
The constraints also can be useful to stimulate changes to the 
status quo. Psychological research has shown that people are 
reluctant to make changes without a clear-cut and sensible 
sounding set of reasons to justify one's conduct.277 The con-
straints can serve as the basis for articulating such reasons. 
Thus, the constraints would create a form of broader accountabil-
ity that increases flexible and multi-dimensional thinking by 
mandating consideration of a wide range of ideas as an integral 
part of the rulemaking process.278 
E. CONCLUSION 
This Article is intended to continue the dialogue begun by 
Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott on rulemaking by 
private legislatures. Private rulemaking has, and will continue to 
have, an important role in the creation of uniform state laws. The 
precise definition and conscious application of constraints will 
further legitimize this role by making explicit those considerations 
that are essential to any good rulemaking process and by counter-
balancing interest group influences. The constraints also will help 
rulemakers to judge consequences of proposed rules while adding 
focus, conceptual clarity, and intellectual rigor to the rulemaking 
process. Constraints also may have application to public rulemak-
ing and, to a more limited extent, to judicial decisionmaking. 
211 See ill. at 364 (providing evidence that individuals are less likely to be blamed when 
one can offer Bound reasoning for conduct); ill. at 367 (detailing status quo effect). 
278 The use of psychological methodology to shed light on law can be compared with law 
and economics. According to Tetlock, "[t]wo hard core assumptions have proved particularly 
fruitful in the study of judgment and choice-the view of the person as intuitive psychologist 
and as intuitive economist." [d. at 332. Both views, however, are imperfect: "The 
psychologist and economist metaphors are like beacons: They highlight some aspects of 
judgment and choice, but leave equally important aspects in the dark." [d. "The 
preponderance of the evidence currently favors a moderately pessimistic assessment of our 
skills as both intuitive psychologists and economists. • •• And we oRen ignore variables to 
which normative theories say we should attend. In many situations, people are as oblivious 
to opportunity costs as they are to sunk costs." [d. at 334·35. The reason for theBe 
shortcomings is that "[p]eople ••• are limited.capacity information processors •••• " [d. at 
335. This suggests at least two responses: first, any study oflaw and economics, or oflaw 
and psychology, must acknowledge these inherent shortcomings; second, law and economic 
predictions of human behavior may benefit by taking psychology into account. 
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APPENDIX 
MODEL OF A BASIC CHECKLIST To APPLY THE CONSTRAIN'I'S* 
CONSTRAINT: 
I. CLARITY 
II. FLEXIBILITY 
III. FAmNESS 
MEANING: 
Clarity reflects the 
goal of preserving 
expectations so that 
parties to commercial 
transactions will know 
in advance what is 
expected of them and 
the consequences of 
their actions. 
Flexibility preserves 
freedom of contract by 
allowing consenting 
parties to reach con-
tractual arrangements 
different than those 
contemplated by law. 
Flexibility also allows 
the continuing devel-
opment in the market-
place of new forms of 
commercial trans-
actions. 
Fairness helps to pre-
serve expectations by 
ensuring that parties 
are governed by neu-
tral rules. 
Fairness also can 
mean, in more limited 
circumstances, that 
the law should protect 
weaker parties, such 
INDICATORS: 
Can parties (and judges) 
understand from the text of 
the rule what is expected of 
them and others? 
Is the rule so detailed as to 
undercut flexibility and the 
ability to innovate? 
Is the rule flexible enough 
to permit parties to adapt 
to changed circumstances? 
Are parties whose behavior 
is being regulated suffici-
ently sophisticated so that 
fairness requires only 
neutral rules? 
Is there such a gross 
imbalance of the parties' 
sophistication (such as in 
consumer transactions) 
that the rules should take 
* This checklist is subject to the discussion in the Article. 
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CONSTRAINT: 
IV. SIMPLICITY OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
v. CONSISTENCY 
VI. COMPLETENESS 
MEANING: 
as those with less bar-
gaining power, that op-
portunistic behavior 
shoUld be prevented in 
circumstances that 
could not have been 
contemplated in ad-
vance, and that implicit 
rules of conduct should 
be recognized if they 
arise from widespread 
courses of dealing in 
an industry or from 
particular courses of 
dealing between spe-
cific parties. 
Simplicity of imple-
mentation reduces 
transaction costs. 
Consistency helps to 
preserve expectations 
and also minimizes 
transaction costs by 
eliminating multiple 
or conflicting legal 
requirements. 
Completeness helps to 
minimize transaction 
costs by systematizing 
rights and obligations 
under developing areas 
of the law without 
waiting for the slower 
and more ad hoc pro-
cess of the common 
law. 
INDICATORS: 
extrinsic factors into 
account? 
Is the rule simple to 
understand and apply? 
Will implementation of the 
rule be practical and cost-
effective? 
Is the rule internally 
consistent? 
Is the rule consistent, or 
at least not inconsistent, 
with related bodies of law 
(whether state, federal, or 
international)? 
Does the rule address the 
entire subject matter of the 
behavior being regulated? 
If the rule is to address 
changes in behavior caused 
by a change in technology, 
does the new technology 
affect the way in which 
transactions are conducted 
(procedural) or does it affect 
substantive rights? 
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MEANING: INDICATORS: 
Should the rule be "abso-
lutely completeD and there-
fore intended to be inter-
preted without reference to 
other sources? Orshould the 
rule be "relatively completeD 
and therefore intended to be 
interpreted by reference to 
sources outside the rule? 
How should flexibility and 
absolute completeness be 
balanced? 

